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ABSTRACT
IMPLEMENTATION IN DOMINANT STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM
ÖZGÜR KIBRIS 
MA in Economics 
Supervisor; Prof. Dr. Semih Koray 
79 pages 
February 1995
A social choice rule is any proposed solution to the problem of collective decision making 
and it embeds the normative features that can be attached to the mentioned problem. 
Implementation of social choice rules in dominant strategy equilibrium is the 
decentralization of the decision power among the agents such that the outcome that is a 
priori recommended by the social choice rule can be obtained as a dominant strategy 
equilibrium outcome of the game form which is endowed with the preferences of the 
individuals. This work has two features. First, it is a survey on the literature on 
implementation in dominant strategy and its link with the economic theory. Second, it 
constructs some new relationships among the key terms of the literature. In this 
framework, it states and proves a slightly generalized version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
impossibility theorem. Moreover, it states and proves that the cardinality o f a single- 
peaked domain converges to zero as the number o f alternatives increase to infinity.
Keywords: Social Choice Rule, Implementation, Game Form, Normal Form Game, 
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium, Strategy Proofiiess, Decomposable 
Preference Domain, Single-Peaked Preference Domain.
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BASKIN STRATEJİ DENGELERİ ARACILIĞIYLA UYGULAMA
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79 sayfa 
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Bir grup bireyin ortak karar alma problemine önerilen herhangi bir çözüme bir toplumsal 
seçim kuralı denir. Toplumsal seçim kurallanmn oyun formlarının baskın strateji 
dengeleri aracılığıyla uygulanması bu kurallarca önerilen sonuçlann, karar yetkisinin 
bireyler arasında dağıtılması sonucu ortaya çıkan ve bireylerin tercihleri ile donanmış 
olan oyun formlannın baskın strateji denge sonuçlan ile elde edilmesi demektir. Bu 
çalışmanın İkili bir niteliği vardır. Birincisi, bahsi geçen teori ve bunun ekonomi teorisine 
uygulanımı ile ilgili bir literatür araştırması yapılmaktadır. İkincisi, literatürdeki kimi 
anahtar terimler arası yeni ilişkiler - elde edilmektedir. Bu çerçevede Gibbard- 
Satterthwaite imkansızlık teoreminin daha genel bir uyarlaması sunulur ve ispatlanır. 
Bunun dışında, alternatif sayısı sonsuza giderken tek-tepeli tanım kümelerinin 
kardinalitesinin sıfıra gittiği ispatlanır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Toplumsal Seçim Kuralı, Uygulama, Oyun Formu, Normal Formlu 
Oyun, Baskın Strateji Dengesi, Strateji Geçirmezlik, Aynştmlabilir 
Tercih Tanım Kümesi, Tek-tepeli Tercih Tamm Kümesi.
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INTRODUCTION
Collective decision making has been one o f the main concerns of political and 
social sciences for a long time. It refers to a wide range o f situations spanning from voting 
methods to allocation rules. Modelization o f collective decision making always involves 
both normative and positive features. While the normative side includes prescriptive value 
judgements represented by social choice rules, the positive side analyzes the strategic 
behavior as represented by game theoretic equilibrium concepts.
Social choice theory is concerned with normative decision making; several agents 
have to decide on some issue of collective interest whereas their preferences about the 
issue may differ. A social choice rule is any proposed solution to this problem. Its being 
normative is rooted in its dependency on social norms, ethics, etc..
Given that the society views as desirable certain ethics o f collective decision, is it 
possible, and so how, to decentralize the decision power among individual agents in such a 
way that by freely exercising this decision power the agents eventually select the very 
outcome(s) recommended as a priori desirable? This is called as the implementation 
problem  and it is central for the link among the normative and the positive properties of 
collective decision making. Thus, a social choice rule, given the preferences of the 
individuals, recommends an outcome according to some normative criteria . The process 
of achieving this outcome (mostly through the decentralization o f the decision power) is 
called as implementation. This task is mainly the obtainment of cooperative goals via 
noncooperative tools.
This characterization is closely related to the neoclassical definition of the 
democracy. H. Moulin, in his 1983 book, “The Strategy of Social Choice”[13], defines 
democracy as follows; “Democracy, in its neoclassical context means that the goals of 
collective action must rely on the opinion of individuals and these opinions only”. Thus, 
the tools that democracies use to obtain social goals should be identical to those of the 
mechanisms that are used to implement social choice rules via decentralization of the 
decision power.
Economics, being a social science itself, has faced the problem o f collective 
decision making in several different ways. One of the most striking fields is the allocation 
problem. While the normative side of the approach proposes some concepts such as 
Pareto optimality, the outcome is implemented through pseudo-games which are called as 
abstract economies. The social equilibrium of an abstract economy is shown to be identical 
to the competitive equilibrium of a pure exchange economy and is shown to satisfy some 
socially desirable conditions such as Pareto optimality in the case o f private goods. This is 
nothing but a kind Nash implementation of an allocation rule satisfying some desirable 
criteria.
It is wide known in economic theory that while in case o f private goods a socially 
desirable allocation rule can be implemented via the social equilibrium of an abstract 
economy, this is not the case for public goods. The phenomenon is called as the provision 
of public goods and there is a bunch of literature about this issue which mainly agrees 
about the occurrence of a “prisoners-dilemma”- like situation in case o f public goods. This 
is a typical case where the individuals benefit through misrepresenting their preferences, 
and is thus closely related to the strategy proofiiess concept discussed in this paper.
The concept, strategy proofness ( or equivalently nonmanipulability) o f a social 
choice rule, is mainly rooted in the knowledge of the individuals that their preferences 
about the issue have, up to some degree, an effect on the socially desirable outcome(s) 
that is (are) chosen by the social choice rule mentioned. The important point is whether an 
individual has an incentive to misrepresent his/her preferences. If there occurs such a case, 
the strategical misrepresentation of the individuals may lead to an outcome that is an 
undesirable one in terms o f the criteria defined above.
The penchant that individuals have for strategizing, causes economic theorists 
trouble because the essence of an individual’s strategic choice is to guess correctly the 
actions of other individuals and then to choose the action that results in the best attainable 
outcome for himselfiherself But in case of the lack of coordination among individuals, this 
may lead to undesirable outcomes.
For strategy proof mechanisms, the question of strategy never arises, because no 
agent has a reason to deviate from the dominant strategy of truth telling. This makes the
analysis o f strategy proof mechanisms trivial in comparison to the analysis of mechanisms 
that are not strategy proof, because questions about the information that agents possess 
about the others can be ignored.
There are two important points about strategy proofhess. The first one is that it 
can only be defined for the social choice rules that are singleton-valued (social choice 
functions). This is mainly because o f the necessity that each individual has to compare the 
outcome that occurs when he/she tells the truth to the ones that he/she can obtain through 
misrepresentation for each possible preferences of the other individuals. Since the 
individuals have preference relations that are on the elements o f the alternative set, they 
can’t use these preferences to compare subsets of this alternative set. However, under 
some circumstances, the concept of strategy proofhess can be extended to the concept of 
implementibility in the dominant strategy equilibria of a mechanism (game form). This is 
the second important point and is closely related to the implementation problem mentioned 
above.
A mechanism (game form) is a set of strategy spaces for each individual and a 
function ( the outcome fiinction) that leads a strategy tuple to the outcome space. It lacks 
a preference profile for the individuals and when attached a preference profile is called as a 
game. Note that a social choice function can be viewed as a game form where the strategy 
spaces o f each individual is a set o f the admissible preferences for that individual and the 
outcome function is simply the social choice function itself This kind o f mechanisms are 
called as revelation mechanisms. In such a setting, the sincere revelation of the preferences 
occurs as a dominant strategy equilibrium of the game that is produced by attaching the 
(true) preferences of the individuals to the mentioned revelation mechanism in case of 
strategy proofhess.
Dominant strategy implementability of a social choice rule means that there exists a 
mechanism such that for any (true) preference profile of the individuals, the outcome of 
the social choice rule one-to-one matches with the outcome(s) generated by the dominant 
strategy equilibrium(s) of the implementing mechanism. Mostly, the concept o f strategy 
proofness can be used interchangeably with dominant strategy implementability. Though 
most o f the literature about strategy proofhess doesn’t find it necessary to distinguish
between these concepts, there are some conditions that has to be satisfied to use these 
terns interchangeably.
At this point, there may occur a question o f why the concept o f dominant strategy 
equilibria is used instead of other wide known solution concepts such as Nash equilibria. 
The main reason of this is dominant strategy equilibria being the most noncooperative one 
among all solution concepts. In dominant strategy equilibria, the individual does not need 
any information about the others while making his/her strategical choice. That means, if 
the individuals have dominant strategies that they can utilize, they don’t need to make any 
strategical guess about what the others do. Thus, no information problem occurs for 
dominant strategy equilibria to be reached in a game.
Since the main aim of the implementation business is the obtainment of cooperative 
outcomes via noncooperative tools, and since it is hard to obtain cooperation in case of 
inability to keep the track of deviations from this cooperation, it is a good solution to 
prepare a playground to the individuals (game form) such that they can act according to 
their incentives and at last obtain the cooperative outcome. The best way to do this is the 
dominant strategy implementability o f the social choice rule that leads the individuals to 
cooperative outcomes. Such a situation has two main advantages to the other solution 
concepts. The first one is the innecessity of information as mentioned above and the 
second advantage (compared to the Nash concept ) is that it is known how the system 
reaches to the dominant strategy equilibrium. The situation is different for the Nash 
equilibrium concept. It quarantees that when reached to the Nash equilibrium the 
individuals have no incentive to deviate from it, but tells nothing about how this 
equilibrium will be reached.
As a result of the above reasons, the history of the implementation literature starts 
with dominant strategy implementation. This is followed by the famous Gibbard- 
Satterthwaite impossibility theorem which tells that under certain conditions it is 
impossible to find a strategy proof social choice function that is nondictatorial. This result 
and the restrictiveness of the domains that admit the construction o f strategy proof and 
nondictatorial social choice rules lead the literature to focus on some alternative solution 
concepts such as Nash equilibrium.
This thesis is a combination o f the followings: a survey of the literature on strategy 
proofhess, the task of completing the points which are implicitly assumed by the literature 
and not formally analyzed up to date, and some new findings that are an addition to the 
theory of social choice. It mainly aims to be a starting point for who wants to deal with the 
social choice theory. Thus, all the concepts used are defined and related to each other in 
an axiomatic approach. Since there is a wide range o f different terminology and definitions 
about some of the concepts in the literature, we found it necessaiy to combine them under 
a uniform terminology.
The thesis includes five main parts, excluding the conclusion part. The first 
chapter, which is called as the “preliminaries”, constructs the model, giving the necessary 
definitions and some relationships among the concepts introduced. In this chapter, the 
presented relationships are limited to that ones which were proved by other authors. The 
second chapter is formed of two sections. The first section is a presentation of the 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, its proof and its relationship with Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem. The second section presents three alternative ways to get rid of this 
impossibility in implementation. In the third chapter we present our main findings about 
the relationship between strategy proofness and dominant strategy implementability and an 
extended impossibility theorem together with other findings about the relationships among 
the other concepts used in the thesis. The fourth chapter relates the strategy proofhess 
concept with economics and presents an introduction of this concept to the allocation 
problem. The last chapter is about the rareness of the domains that permit the construction 
of strategy proof mechanisms that are nondictatorial. In this fi’amework, single­
peakedness, one of the most well-known examples of this appreciated domains is analyzed 
and it is shown that the probability of obtaining a single-peaked domain goes to zero as 
the number o f alternatives increases.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Let N={l,...,n} be a society of n individuals who must select a group of 
alternatives from an alternative set, A={x,y,...,w} which is finite. Each individual isN  has 
a complete and transitive (and thus reflexive) binary relation on the set A. The set of all 
complete and transitive orderings on A is defined as Moreover the set o f all linear 
orders on A will be called as L(A). The preference domain, Di(A) for an individual i, will 
be defined as a subset of moreover D(A) will be defined as the Cartesian product of 
Di(A)s of each individual. We will denote the set o f nonempty subsets o f A as IT. For a 
binary relation P on A, the set of elements of A that are maximal with respect to this 
binary relation will be shown as argmaxP; moreover for any BeTI, the elements of B that 
are maximal with respect to P will be shown as argmaxaP.
Definition: {Social Choice Rule)
A Social Choice Rule (SCR) is a nonempty-valued correspondence from a domain of 
preference profiles, D(A), which is either a subset o f Q" or a subset of L(A)", on A to a 
range of alternatives, A. That means, F: D(A) -^A  is a SCR if it is nonempty valued. 
From now on we will call F a social choice function, SCF, if it is singe valued, and a 
social choice correspondence, SCC, if it is set valued.
Definition: ( Game Form ox Mechanism)
A game form, g, is an (N+1) tuple g=(Xi, isN ; n ) where
a) For all ieN , Xi is the strategy (message) space of individual i
b) %■. X ^ A  is a function (an outcome function) where X= n ^ ,
leW
From now on the terms game form  and mechanism will be used interchangeably.
Deflnition: (Normal Form Game)
Given a game form, g=(X i, isN ; tu ), and a preference profile R = rii? , where ReD(A),
I6W
g[R]=(Xi, Ri 071, ieN) is a normal form game (NFG) where agent i’s strategy is Xi gX; 
and his/her utility is determined through Ri (ti(x)) where x =(xi,...,Xn).
Definition: (Dominant Strategy)
Given a NFG, g[R]=(X|, R  o;:, iGN), a strategy Xi of individual i is said to be a dominant 
strategy (DS) of i if for any strategy tuple of the other individuals there doesn’t exist 
another strategy of i which makes him/her strictly better-off That is, for all y.iGX.i and for 
all ZiGXi, 7r(xi, y.i) Ri 7i(zi, y.i).
Definition: (Dominant Strategy Equilibrium of a NFG)
A strategy n-tuple x=(xi ,...,Xn) is said to be a dominant strategy equilibrium  (DSE) of a 
NFG if for each individual i, Xi is a dominant strategy of that individual. The set of 
dominant strategy equilibria of a NFG, g[R]=(Xi, R  o%, iGN), are shown as a(g[R]).
Definition: (Implementability)
A social choice rule (SCR), F:D(A)—>^A, is said to be implementable if there exists a 
mechanism g=(X,7i) s.t. for all R gD(A), F(R)=7t(a(g[R])). Note that the right hand side is 
not necessarily the image of a single value, but is used to denote a subset of the range. A, 
formed of the images of the Dominant strategy equilibria of the normal form game (NFG), 
g[R], with respect to the outcome Sanction 7t.
Note that every social choice Sanction can be viewed as a mechanism (game form) 
where for each individual IgN, R  =Dj (A). This kind of mechanisms are called as 
Revelation Mechanisms. That is, if F is a SCF then gp =(Dj(A), iGN; F) is a Revelation 
Mechanism. These mechanisms have the property that the strategy for each individual is 
revealing his/her preference ordering on the feasible set, and the outcome function is 
simply the SCF itself
For later usage during the construction o f the relation between the social choice 
rules and Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem we need to define what a social welfare 
function is.
Definition: (Social Welfare Function)
A function f;D(A)^B(A) is said to be a social welfare function  where B(A) is a nonempty 
subset of n . Given the preference profile of the society, a social welfare function assigns 
this profile to a social preference. That is for any R6D(A), f(R) is a binary relation on 
AxA.
Now, to be able to construct a social welfare function (SWF) that satisfies the 
conditions necessary for the presentation of the Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem, we 
need the following properties.
r
Definition: (Agreeing profiles)
Given a subset B of A, the alternative set, and two admissible preference profiles 
P,QeD(A), P and Q are said to agree on B  if for each individual isN , and for each x,y€B, 
(xP;y iff xQiy) holds.
Definition: (Independence of irrelevant alternatives)
A SWF is said to satisfy the condition of independence o f irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if 
for any subset B of A and any two admissible preference profiles P,QsD(A) which agree 
on the set B, the SWF, f, should lead to the same ordering on B for each profile P and Q. 
That is, for all x,yeB, (xf(P)y iff xf(Q)y) should hold.
Definition: (Monotonicity)
Let B and C be subsets of A s.t. C=B\{x}. Now monotonicity is satisfied if whenever
(i) there are profiles P and Q s.t. for all z,yeC and for all isN , (zPiy iff zQiy) holds and
(ii) for all yeC, xPiy implies xQiy
then for all yeB , xf(P)y implies xf(Q)y.
Then comes the definition o f strategy proofness.
Deflnition: {Strategy Proofness, Nonmanipulability)
A SCF, F;D(A)-»A is said to be strategy p ro o f (nonmanipulable) if for any admissible 
profile R e D(A), for any individual i e N and for any preference Q; e 
Di(A),
F(Ri,R.i)RiF(Qi,R.i).
That is, an individual should not have any incentive to misrepresent his/her sincere 
preference whatever the others do. It is clear that a SCF is said to be strategy p ro o f \^ \i, 
as a revelation mechanism, is strategy proof A revelation mechanism, gF=(D(A), F), is 
strategy proof, if for each admissible preference profile ReD(A), RGo(gF[R]). Strategy 
proofhess is also referred as nonmanipulability since in case o f strategy proofhess no 
individual has an incentive to manipulate the mechanism via misrepresenting his/her true 
preference.
This means that for each individual i with the preference ordering R j , playing 
anything other than R  is not strictly preferred to playing R  whatever the other agents 
play. The above definition turns into the claim that revealing the true preferences on the 
outcome should be a dominant strategy for each agent in the society. This is important 
since the fact that “the individuals can’t be forced to report their preferences sincerely” is 
the crux of the problem considered here.
There is another point worth to mention here. There may be a case where the 
agents have dominant strategies in revealing their preferences and these dominant strategy 
revelations are not necessarily the true preferences of the agents. Such mechanisms are 
called as dominant strategy revelation mechanisms. This means that the set o f strategy 
proof revelation mechanisms is a little bit narrower than the set of dominant strategy 
revelation mechanisms. This does not create a problem because o f the 1973 result of 
Gibbard [9] claiming that every dominant strategy revelation mechanism that is not
strategy proof is equivalent to a strategy proof revelation mechanism. Looking at the 
broader class doesn’t add any generality to the analysis. The term equivalent is used here 
to denote that the two mechanisms which are said to be equivalent lead to the same 
outcomes when the true preferences o f the individuals are identical in the two cases.
Definition: (Eqiiivnlence in DSE)
Two mechanisms, gi=(S|, Tti) and g2=(S2 , 712) are said to be equivalent in DSE  if for each 
admissible preference profile ReD(A), tz\ (ct(gi[R]))=7t2( C5(g2[R]))·
Proposition: (Gibbard)
Let h=(D(A). k) be a revelation mechanism which implements a SCF, F, in dominant 
strategy equilibrium but is not strategy proof Then there exists a strategy proof revelation 
mechanism g=(D(A). G) which is equivalent to h.
Proof: Assume that h=(D(A), k) is a dominant strategy revelation mechanism which 
implements a SCF, F, in dominant strategy equilibrium but is not strategy proof Take 
any RsD(A). then ReG(h[R]) since h is not strategy proof Moreover since h is a 
dominant strategy mechanism a(h[R])?i0, and since h implements F for all sea(h[R]), 
lt(s)=F(R).
Now for each individual i, define the function d;: Dj(A)-»Di(A) such that di(Ri) gives a 
dominant strategy of individual i with the preference Rj. Define d as an n-tuple of these 
functions, i.e. d=(di,. . .,d„). Now let G=Kod. To show that g is strategy proof suppose the 
contrary, i.e. there exists a profile ReD(A) and an ordering SisDi(A) s.t. in the normal 
form game, g[R],
G(R) ~Ri G(Si, R-i)
i.e. 7i( d-i(R-i), di(Ri)) ~Ri n( d.i(R.i), s;)
which contradicts with the assumption that di(Ri) is a dominant strategy of the i’th 
individual. So g is strategy proof. Moreover, for all ReD(A),
F(R)=;r(a(h[R])) =G(a(g[R]))=G(R).
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Thus g is a strategy proof mechanism.
QED
Now since the set of dominant strategy mechanisms is broader than the set of 
strategy proof mechanisms, one can easily find an example where the mechanism is 
strategy proof but doesn’t implement the SCR it is associated with. Such an example and a 
characterization of the equivalence between strategy proofhess and dominant strategy 
implementibility in SCF’s will be presented as a result in the following chapters.
Having defined strategy proofness both in terms of social choice functions and 
direct revelation mechanisms, we will now deal with the question of whether one can build 
strategy proof mechanisms satisfying certain other criteria. To illustrate what one can 
expect to have additional to strategy proofness in a mechanism, we will give certain 
examples.
Example 1: (Imposed Mechanisms)
The first example is a mechanism which leads to a certain outcome independent of the 
strategical choice of the agents, i.e. g=(X, %) where ti: X—>A is s.t. for all xeX , 7t(x)=a 
where a is defined to be a unique element of A. This mechanism is a dominant strategy 
mechanism because of the fact that the strategical choice of an individual doesn’t affect 
the outcome of tlie mechanism makes any strategy a dominant strategy(The mechanism, 
also, is strategy proof if it is a revelation mechanism). Though this mechanism satisfies the 
appreciated property of being a dominant strategy mechanism, one has to accept the fact 
that this kind of a mechanism will not be approved by the individuals in any situation of 
social choice. Here the distribution of power doesn’t create a major problem solely for the 
reason that the power is not distributed. There may be another case where the power is 
distributed among tlie individuals but unjustly.
11
Definition: (Dictatorial SCR) ·
Given a SCR F: D(A)->A, an individual d sN  is said to be a dictator of F if for all 
ReD(A), F(R)cargma.\(R,i). A SCR F: D(A)-^A is said to be dictatorial if there exists an 
individual d who is a dictator in F.
Definition: (Dictatorial Mechanism)
A mechanism, g=(X,7t) is said to be dictatorial if for any admissible preference profile 
ReD(A), 7t(a(g[R]) ) cargmax(Rd) where d is defined to be a dictator in the society, N.
Example 2: (Dictatorial Mechanism)
Let g=(X,7i) be .s.t. tor each individual i, Xi=A and %\ X—>A is s.t. for any xeX , 7t(x)=Xd. 
Thus the dictator, cl. tells which outcome he/she wants to obtain and it occurs as the 
outcome of the mechanism. Now this is a dominant strategy mechanism since for each 
individual othei" than the dictator any strategy is a dominant strategy and the dominant 
strategy of the dictator is one of his/her topmost choices. Though this mechanism has 
dominant strategy equilibria for any admissible preference profile, it is unacceptable (of 
course from the view point of the tenants) since the distribution of power is unjust.
Both of these examples are about the cases where a big number of individuals have 
no decision power at all. The distribution of power among the agents in the society will be 
one of our main concerns and we will try to obtain mechanisms which give sufficient 
scope for individual preferences to affect the social choice. In the first step we will try to 
obtain this thi ough two properties called as the Pareto Criterion and Nondictatorship.
Definition: (Pareto Ch iterion, Quasi Pareto Criterion)
A mechanism g=(X, n) {a SCF F:D(A)^A} is said to satisfy the Quasi Pareto Criterion 
if for any R g D(A) and any x,yeA, xR;y and y~Rx for each individual, then Tt(a(g[R]))?iy
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{F(R)5iy}'. A mechanism g=(X, 7i) { a SCF F:D(A)->A} is said to satisfy the Pareto 
Criterion if for any ReD(A) and any x,yeA, xRiy for each individual, and y~RjX for some 
individual j , then 7t(o(g[R]))7iy { F(R)7^y }.
This means that an alternative to which another alternative is preferred by all o f the 
society can’t be chosen as socially optimal. When the set of admissible preferences is 
restricted to be a subset of the linear orders on A, strategy proofhess automatically implies 
the Pareto Criterion. This will be shown later, in a more general framework. 
Nondictatorship is simply the case of unexistence o f a dictator in a mechanism.
Additional to these requirements we require the alternative space not be limited 
and the set of admissible preferences as broad as possible. At this point there occurs the 
question of whethei’ one can obtain a SCF which satisfies all o f these requirements. 
Unfortunately the answer of this question is no. This is because o f the famous Gibbard- 
Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem which was independently proved by Mark A. 
Satterthwaite [16] and Alan Gibbard [9] in 1973.
For a more detailed analysis of the concepts mentioned above we have to 
introduce some new definitions and some propositions about the relationships between 
these new definitions and the ones above. First of all we have to extend the definition o f a 
SCR to apply it in the analysis of the relation between social choice rules and social 
welfare functions.
Definition: ( Generalized Social Choice Rule)
A nonempty valued correspondence F :D (A )xn^A  is said to be a generalized social 
choice rule (GSCR) if for all B e l l  and for all ReD(A), F(R,B)cB. From now on F will 
be called as a generalized social choice function (GSCF) if it is singleton valued and a 
generalized social choice correspondence (GSCC) otherwise.
' This definition is usuall> referred as Pareto Criterion in many texts, but formally is weaker than the 
original definition of Paicio Criterion. Thus from now on a distinction will be made between tliese two 
definitions.
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Definition: (Pseudo-game form)
Given a game form h=(S,n) and the outcome space A, it. pseudo-game form  hB=(SB,7tB) for 
a B e l l  is s.t. S |;=[si S / Tr(s)eB) and 7tB:SB->B is the outcome function.
Definition: (Dominant strategy equilibrium of a Pseudo-game)
Given a pseudo-game Iib[R], a member s*s Sb is a dominant strategy equilibrium  of 
hB[R] if for all i N, s ; i s  a dominant strategy o f individual i relative to B.
For any strategy Si = S, of i , define SB,-i(si)={s.ieSB,-i /  (Si,s.i)eSB} and for any s-jsSB.-i 
define SB.i(s.i)=!siGSn, / (Si,s.i)eSB}.
A strategy si* of individual i is said to be a dominant strategy o f i relative to B  
if SB,-i(si*)7i0 , for all s.iGSB,-i(Si*) and for all Si’eSB,i(s.j), 7tB(Si*,s.i)Ri7tB(si’,s.i).
Definition: ( Pseudo Implementation in DSE )
We say that a mechanism h=(S,7t) pseudo implements a GSCR F:D (A)xn—>A in 
Dominant Strategy ¡¿([¡lilihrium if for any B e ll, hB=(SB,7iB) implements F( . , B) in DSE 
relative to B. That is, for all ReD(A), F(R,B)=7tB(o(hB[R])).
Definition: ( Implementation in DSE )
We say that a mechanism class h={ hB=(SB ,7tB) / B e l l  } (where any two mechanisms 
implementing F foi· dilferent subset of A need not be related to each other ) implements a 
GSCR, F:D(A)xri—>A, in Dominant Strategy Equilibrium  if for any B gIT, hB=(SB,7tB) 
implements F ( . , B) in DSE. That is, for all ReD(A), F(R,B)=7tB(cr(hB[R])).
The main difference between pseudo implementibility and implementibility is that 
while the rectangularness of the strategy space is sacrificed for the sake o f creating the 
mechanism class from a single mechanism that implements F( . ,A) in case of pseudo 
implementibility, the other extreme is held in implementibility. That is, for the sake of
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having rectangular si rategy spaces (which need not be related ) for each subset of A, the 
relationship among the mechanisms in the implementing class is left aside.
At this point whether one can find a kind of implementibility that is endowed with 
both of these appreciated properties arises as an interesting question. This kind of an 
implementibility. whicli we will call as total implementibility, can be defined as follows.
Definition: ( Total implementation in DSE )
We say that a meciianism class h={ hB=(SB .ttb) / B e l l  } totally implements a GSCR, 
F ;D (A )xn^A , in ¡dominant Strategy Equilihrhim  if for any B s l l ,  hB=(SB,7CB) ,which is 
itself a game form and is a restriction of hA=(SA ,7ía) implements F( . ,  B) in DSE. That is, 
for all R gD(A), F(R.B)=KB(a(hB[R])).
In total implementation the essential point is that while the strategy space remains 
rectangular for each subset of A, moreover, it is obtained through the restriction o f the 
mechanism hA which implements F( . ,A). That is, for each ieN, S¡,b is obtained through 
the restriction of Si. \ and ttbíSb-^B  is a function. One example of this kind of a mechanism 
class is the one ihai is obtained through the restrictions of the revelation mechanism 
1ia=(D(A), Fa) where Fa=F. For any B eO , the mechanism that implements F( . ,B) is 
hs=(D(B), Fo) where for each isN , D¡(B) is the restriction of the preference domain of i, 
Dj(A) on B, and F|i:D(B)^B is s.t. for any RbgD(B), Fb(Rb)=F(R,B) (where Rb is the 
restriction of R on E3).
To associate the generalized social choice rules with social welfare functions, we 
need the following property on a generalized social choice rule.
Definition: (Rationality)
Let F:D(A)xri—>A be a GSCR. F is said to be a rational SCR if there exists a SWF, f, s.t. 
F=Ff where F| is s.t. for all ReD(A) and for all B e ll ,  F(R,B)=argmaxBÍ(R).
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Rationality implies a SCR be consistent among different alternative sets. That 
means, if F chooses an alternative x from the grand set A, it should also choose x in 
another set B cA  which also includes x.
Definition: (Choice function)
A function ciFl—>n is called a choice function for A if for all B e ll , c(B)oB.
Definition: Let R he a relation on A. We define c( . ,R):I1^2'^ by 
c(B,R)={xeB / for all yeB, y~Rx} for any B e l l .
Definition: (Hauthakker’s axiom)
Let c : n ^ n  be a choice function. We say that c satisfies Hauthakker’s axiom  (HA) if for 
all B ,C e ll and for all x,yeBnC, [xec(A) and yec(B) implies xec(B)].
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3 STATE OF THE ART
Now, we will present the main paths followed in the dominant strategy 
implementation theory up to date. We will first present the Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
impossibility theorem, which is a cornerstone in the dominant strategy implementation 
theory, together with a formal proof of it which is essential for the link between this 
theorem and the famous impossibility theorem of Arrow. We will also present a proof for 
the two individuals and three alternatives case to help the reader to gain a better 
understanding of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Then, we will present the main paths 
that were followed in history to overcome the impossibility problem in implementation via 
altering the framew ci k.
3.1 Impo.ssibility Theorems
Theorem: (Gibbard- Satterthwaite)
If I A| >3 and prefei ences are unrestricted (Di(A)= Q  or L(A) for all isN  ) then a SCF, F, 
can not simultaneously be strategy proof and satisfy both the Quasi Pareto Criterion and 
nondictatorship.
This imi^ossibility theorem is closely related to Arrow’s 1963 result which states 
the impossibility of the existence of a social welfare function which satisfies certain 
conditions.
A social welfare function (SWF) for the alternative set A is a single valued 
function, f, that maps the set of admissible preference profiles to a subset of Q. With each 
SWF, f, one can associate a SCF, F f, s.t. for all feasible profile P,Ff(P)=argmaxf(P).
To understand the relation between Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow 
theorem, firstly we have to gain a deeper insight about Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. 
Arrow’s theorem iiwestigates the social welfare functions, f, which satisfy the conditions
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of Pareto Criterion, nondictatorship and two additional conditions: independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and monotonicity.
Theorem: (Aitow)
If the cardinality of tJie alternative set. A, is greater than or equal to three and preferences 
are restricted to be eitlier the flill domain of L(A) or D, then a SWF can’t simultaneously 
satisfy the Pareto Criterion, nondictatorship, IIA and monotonicity.
Now having given the Arrow impossibility theorem we can start to the discussion 
of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. There exists two independent proofs to Gibbard- 
Satterthwaite theorem. Satterthwaite’s proof, which was at the same time a part of his 
Ph.D. thesis, is mainly based on a counting procedure[16]. Though it has the advantage of 
not using Arrowb·? impossibility theorem, I prefer to mention here Gibbard’s proof 
[9]which is more iastriicting about strategy proofness and the relation between Gibbard- 
Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s theorem. Additional to Gibbard’s proof, I will give 
Feldman’s 1979 proof [8] for the two individuals, three alternatives case which, I hope, 
will help to gain an intuition about strategy proofness.
In his 1973 |5ai)er, Gibbard proves that any nondictatorial voting scheme with at 
least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation. The term ‘Voting 
scheme” is used fo!' any scheme which makes a community’s choice depend entirely on 
individuals’ professed preferences among the alternatives.
Gibbard’s proof i§ based on Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Showing that a SWF 
derived from a strategy proof mechanism satisfies all Arrow’s conditions except 
nondictatorship, he claims that every strategy proof mechanism which has a number of 
alternatives greater than 2 is dictatorial. In his paper he uses the term chain ordering to 
denote a linear order.
Defînition: (Chain Ordering)
A chain ordering is an ordering in which no distinct items are indifferent, i.e. P e O  is a 
chain ordering on A if for all x,yeA, xPy and yPx implies x=y.
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Deflnition: (Strict preference relation and indifference relation)
For any BcA, R |sQ  and x,yeA define P, and f  as follows:
(i) xPiyiff y~RiX
(ii) xl;y iff yRiX and xRjy
Thus, Pi is defined to be a strict preference relation while 1; is an indifference relation. 
Deflnition:
Let Q be a chain ordering of A. For any BcA, Risf2 define Pi*B as
(i) If x,y,eB then x(Pj*B)y iff xPiy or (xhy and xQy)
(ii) IfxeB ,y^B  then x(Pi*B)y
(iii) If x,ygB then x(Pj*B)y iff xQy
This new ordering will create an strict preference relation on the alternative set A 
which orders the elements of B automatically above those of A\B.
Proposition: (Gibbard)
From the above definitions are derived
(i) For all ieN, Pi’^ B is a chain ordering.
(ii) If CcB, then for any ieN, (Pi*B)*C=Pi*C.
(iii) Suppose for all ieN, (xPiy iff xQiy) and (yPix iff yQtx) for all x,yeB. Then P*B=Q*B 
where P=(P,,..,.P„) and Q=(Qi,...,Q„)
(iv) If xf(P)y then y~f(P)x
(v) (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, IIA)
Take any x,yeA. Suppose for all ieN , (xPjy iff xQiy) and (yP;x iff yQ;x). Then xf(P)y iff 
xf(Q)y.
The proof of derivation (v) is a simple consequence of derivation (iii) o f the proposition. 
From (iii), P*ix,yi=Q*{x,y} and hence xeF(P*{x,y}) iff xeF(Q*{x,y}). But this, by 
definition, implies that xf(P)y iff xf(Q)y.
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Assertion 1: Define a=(ai,..,a„) where for each isN , Gi:Di(A)-^Si be the dominant 
strategy function for the mechanism h=(S,7r). Let s=ct(P). Take any x,yeA and s’eS 
satisfying,
(a) For all isN , yPjX implies Si’=Sj
(b) For all i€N, x~ liy
(c )  yf(P)x, i.e. X7iF(P*|x,y})=7i:(s)
Then x?i7r(s’)
Proof of Assertion 1:
Suppose x=7r(s’). Let P*=P*{x,yj and let t=o(P*). Then
yRx implies x=y or x?tF(P*) 
which means x;^:F(P*)=7t(a(P*)=7t(t) 
which implies that x;^7i(t)
Define the sequence
S ~ (S i ,$2 ,...,Si; ,S|; ! ,...,S|i ),...,S ~(ti,...,tk,Sk+i ,...,Sn ~(ti,...,tk,tk+i,...,tn)
where 7t(s‘*)=x anci tl(s' V x·
Let k be the least indexed individual s.t. Ti(s*^ )7i:x, 7t(s' '^*)=x.
Case 1: 7t(s' )^=y and yP^x
7t(s'")=y, 7i(s'' ')=x and yPkX implies that 7t(s‘^ )Pk7t(s''' )^ which in turn implies that 
7t(s''’*)~Rk7c(s'') and this means that Sk’ is not a dominant strategy for k. But since yPkX, by 
(a), Sk’=Sk and Sk is by definition a dominant strategy for k. But this leads to a 
contradiction.
Thus x^Tz{s') in this case.
Case 2: Jt(s'^ )vi:y or xPky
If  7i(s’^ )==y then xPky. But this implies that xPk*y which in turn implies xPk*7c(s' )^. I f  7 t ( ^ ^ y  
then since 7t(s‘^ )7ix we have 7t(s^)g{x,y} and by (b), xPk*7i(s''). So xPk*tt(s'^. Now 
x=7t(s' ‘^‘). Hence 7r(s'"')Pk*7i(s‘^ ). Thus tk is not a dominant strategy for individual k. But 
since tk=Gk(Pk*), tk is a dominant strategy for individual k. But this leads to a 
contradiction. Thus xt^k{s'). QED.
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Assertion 2: The dictator for a SWF ,f, which is derived from a SCR, F, is also a dictator
for the mechanism g=(D( A),F).
Proof of Assertion 2: Assume that individual d is a dictator for the SWF f  Then d is a 
dictator for g if for all ye A, there is a Sd(y)eD<i(A) s.t. for all seD(A) s.t. Sd=Sd(y), F(s)=y. 
Let Pd* be the SPTl s.t. for all xeA s.t. XT^ y, yPd*x and let Sd(y)=Od(Pd*). Let seD(A) be 
s.t. Sd=Sd(y) and take any xgA s.t. x^ i^ y. We shall show that F(s);>tx. Let PeD(A) be any 
preference profile ,s.t. P,i=Pd* and for all iGN\{d}, xPiy. Let s’=o(P). Then Sd’=Sd(y). Now 
under this preiercnce profile, P, assumptions (a) and (b) of Assertion 1 are satisfied. 
Moreover since d is a dictator of f, yf(P)x and thus x~f(P)y, i.e. (c) is also satisfied. 
Therefore, x^^Ffs). Since this holds for all xeA\{y}, y=F(s). Thus for any PeD(A) s.t. the 
dictator d strictly prefers y to x, y has to be chosen by g. Thus d is a dictator for g.
QED.
Proof of G ibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: According to the Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem, eveiy SWF violates at least one of the following conditions.
(Scope) (i) A has at least three elements
(Unanimity) (ii) If for all ieN, xPiy then xf(P)y
(IIA) (iii) If for all ieN, (xPiy iff xQiy) and (yPjX iff yQix) then xf(P)y iff xf(Q)y
(Nondictatorship)(iv) There is no dictator for f  where a dictator k eN  is s.t. for all 
ReD(A), x,ye A; if xP^y then xf(P)y
Now, (i) is satisfied by assumption and (iii) is shown to be satisfied by the above 
proposition. So if one shows that (ii) is satisfied, (iv) can’t be satisfied by f  
Now, (ii) will be obtained as a corollary to Assertion 1:
Assume that there is a profile P and alternatives x and y (xi^y) s.t. for each individual ieN,
xPiy. Now we want to show that xf(P)y. Now since x is an outcome there is a strategy s’
s.t. x=7i:(s’). Take .$=a(P). Now we are going to use Assertion 1 in opposite direction. 
That is, we took ,s=a(P) and took any x,yeA. Moreover s’eS is s.t. x=7c(s’). Now
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assumptions (a) and (b) of Assertion 1 still hold in this setting. Thus Assumption (c) 
doesn’t hold, which means that x=F(P*{x,y}). But this holds ifFxf(P)y. Thus condition (ii) 
of the theorem holds, but by Arrow’s theorem means that f  violates the fourth condition of 
nondictatorshijr Moreover if f  is dictatorial then F is also dictatorial by Assertion 2 above. 
Thus every strategy proof game form with at least three outcomes is dictatorial.
QED.
Though Gibbard’s proof is illustrating in terms of the relation between a SCF and a 
SWF, one can gaiP; a better insight to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem by examining the 
Feldman’s proof additionally. Feldman in 1979 has devised a proof for the simple case of 
two individuals and three alternatives: The SCF, F, is defined on the domain L(A)^, and 
for the set of alternatives A={a,b,c}. Initially we will assume that F satisfies the strategy 
proofiiess and the Pareto criterion conditions. Table 1 gives the set o f possible outcomes 
for each preference profile of the society. The table is formed according to the Pareto 
Criterion, thus while in some cases (as cases o f unanimity) it surely determines the 
outcome, in some other cases it determines what can’t be the outcome (according to the 
violation of the Pareto Criterion). The question marks in the table represent the cases 
where no alternati\e can be eliminated. Shortly speaking. Table 1 gives the restrictions 
imposed on F by the Pareto Criterion.
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Table 1.
Agent 2
1 2 3 4 5 6
Agent 1 (xyz) (xzy) (yxz) (yzx) (zxy) (zyx)
1 (xyz) X X ^ Z  ^ ? "
2 (xzy) X X ? * ’^y '
3 (yxz) y y cf 12 T^X ^
4 (yzx) 9 y y ^x ” ;^x
5 (zxy) 7 ;^x Z z
6 (zyx) 9 X 7i:X z z
Since the SCF is single valued, a single alternative must be assigned to each cell. 
We will begin with the assumption that element x is assigned to the cell labeled 1, and 
show that this will lead to the dictatoriality of individual 1. In the alternative assumption of 
assigning z to cell 1, the same proof will lead to the dictatoriality of individual 2.
Now, assigning x to cell 1 implies that x must be assigned to cell 2. This is by 
strategy proofness of F. Now y can’t be assigned to cell 2 by Pareto Criterion, suppose z 
is assigned to cell 2. Then at profile (1,5) (i.e. {(xyz),(zxy)} ), individual 1 can manipulate 
F by declaring (xzy) instead of his/her sincere preference o f (xyz). Thus, assigning z to cell 
2 violates the strategy proofness assumption of F. The same logic leads to the following 
results which are indicated in Table 2.
Table 2.
Cell Assigned Alternative Manip. Manip. Manip. Manip.
outcome outcome situation agent strategy outcome
2 X Z F(l,5)=z one F(2,5) X
3 X Z F(2,5)=x two F(2,6) z
4 X y  or Z F(l,6)=y or Z one F(2,6) X
5 X y F(l,6)=x two F(l,4) y
6 X y F(l,6)=x two F(l,3) y
7 X y F(2,3)=y one F(l,3) X
8 X y  or Z F(2,4)=y or Z one F(l,4) X
9 y Z F(3,6)=z one F(2,6) X
10 y Z F(4,6)-z one F(3,6) y
11 y Z F(4,6)=y two F(4,5) Z
12 y X or Z F(3,5)=x or Z one F(4,5) y
Filling in each indeterminate cell in this manner, both above and below the diagonal 
results in individual I being a dictator, i.e. individual I ’s topmost choice is chosen 
independent of what individual 2 declares.
QED.
Having deilned and proved the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, now 
we will deal with the ways to get rid of his impossibility in implementation.
3.2 Ways to Bypass the Impossibility Problem Via Altering the Fram ew ork
The impossibility result of Gibbard and Satterthwaite, despite being a very 
important result in the implementation of group decision making, is really a discouraging
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one. The result simply says that it is impossible to distribute the decision power among the 
individuals faiily if one expects to have flilfill some essential criteria. To break the 
pessimism about the future of group decision making, three main paths are followed. The 
first one is imposing some restrictions on the preference domain such that the social choice 
rules defined on this restricted domain can overcome the problem of impossibility in 
implementation in the dominant strategy equilibria of a nondictatorial mechanism. The 
second path is changing the equilibrium concept, that is leaving the dominant strategy 
implementibility aside and trying something more accessible such as the Nash 
implementation. The third and the last path is giving up the social choice functions and 
dealing with social choice correspondences instead. Now we will analyze each o f these 
paths in detail.
3.2.1 Domain Restrictions
In the task of restricting the domain of admissible preferences three approaches 
have been followed. The first approach is taking a specific social choice function and 
looking at the domain restrictions that are sufficient to make it strategy proof This is 
closely related to the work of Sen and Pattanaik (1969) [19] and will not be mentioned 
here. The second approach begins with a domain with economic restrictions on 
preferences such as convexity, continuity, etc. and then looks for strategy proof 
mechanisms which are not dictatorial. This approach will be discussed in detail in the next 
section and will be mainly based on a recent work of Salvador Barbera and Matthew 
Jackson (1992). The third approach looks for necessary and sufficient conditions on the 
preferences such that the resulting domain permits the construction of a strategy proof 
social choice fiinction that satisfies some additional restrictions on the power distribution 
as the Pareto criterion and nondictatorship.
In this section we will mainly concentrate on this last approach. Since we know 
that when the domain of preferences is left to be a full domain o f complete preorders or 
linear orders, it is impossible to find a nondictatorial social choice function which is 
strategy proof and Pareto optimal, we have to impose some restrictions on the preference
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domain to obtain n subset appropriate for building acceptable social choice functions. One 
very famous example of such a limitation is the single-peaked domains characterization. 
They will be analyzed in detail in one of the following chapters and it will be shown that 
single-peakedness limitation becomes extraordinarily binding when the cardinality of the 
alternative set goes to infinity.
What we want in this section is to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions on the 
preference domain such that the resulting social choice functions will be nondictatorial and 
will also satisiy strategy proofness and the Pareto criterion. One limitation of the result is 
its only holding for the generalized social choice functions which are rational. The main 
reason for this is that the characterization is based on social welfare functions and thus 
doesn’t hold for nonrational generalized social choice functions ( i.e. the ones which can’t 
be paired with a social welfare function). Before introducing the theorem we must 
formalize the structure necessary for this characterization. For this, we need the below 
definitions.
Definition: (Ordered pairs)
Let A be the alternative set which is finite and let D(A) be s.t for all ieN , Di(A)oL(A) and 
for all ijeN , Di(A)=Dj(A). Now the set of ordered pairs within A is defined as 
T={(x,y)eAxA / x?iy j. Moreover, the set of trivial ordered pairs within D(A) is 
TR(D(A))={(x,y)eT / there exists a P gD(A) s.t. xPy and there doesn’t exist a QeD(A) 
s.t. yQx}.
Definition: ( Being closed under decisiveness implications)
A subset R of T is said is said to be closed under decisiveness implications (closed D I ) if 
for all (x,y), (x,z)gT\TR(D(A)) the following conditions hold:
D ll: If  there are P‘,P^gD(A) with xP^yP'z and yP^zP \ then 
D ll a: (x,y)sR implies (x,z)eR 
Dllb: (z,x)sR  implies (y,x)€R 
DI2: If there is a PsD(A) with xPyPz then
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DI2a: (x,y)sR and (y,z)sR implies (x,z)eR 
DI2b: (z,x)eR implies either (y,x)sR or (x,y)eR
Deflnition; (Decomposable domain)
A domain of prefei ences, D(A), is said to be a decomposable domain if there exists an 
R cT  s.t. TR(D(A))cRcT and R is closed under decisiveness implications.
Definition: (Nondictatorial domain)
A domain of preference profiles, D(A), is said to be a nondictatorial domain if there 
exists a nondictaiorial n-person SWF on D(A) which satisfies monotonicity, IIA and 
Pareto optimality conditions.
A nondictatorial domain as can be seen above, if can be obtained, is sufficient for 
the characterization of social welfare functions that we appreciate. That simultaneously 
leads to a characterization of rational generalized social choice rules that are strategy 
proof and Pareto optimal and also nondictatorial. There are three main theorems built by 
Kalai and Mullet (1977) [II] that constaict the needed characterization. The first one is 
used in the proof of the others and claims that one can find an n-person nondictatorial 
social welfare function if, and only if one can find a 2-person nondictatorial social welfare 
function:
Theorem 1: (Kalai-Muller)
For n>2, there exists a nondictatorial n-person SWF on D(A) which satisfies monotonicity, 
IIA and Pareto optimality iff there exists a nondictatorial 2-person SWF on D(A) which 
satisfies monotonicity, IIA and Pareto optimality.
The following two theorems, using this theorem as an input, characterize 
nondictatorial domains and the relation between these domains, social welfare functions 
and rational generalized social choice functions, respectively:
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Theorem 2: (Kahii-Muller)
A preference domain, D(A), is nondictatorial iff it is decomposable.
This theorem simply says that if one can construct a decomposable domain, D(A), 
then whatever social welfare function defined on this domain satisfies nondictatoriality, 
monotonicity, TIA and the Pareto criterion. Now it is time to construct the relationship of 
these appreciated social welfare functions with the rational generalized social choice rules:
Theorem 3: (Kalai-Muller)
Let n be any integer s.t n>2. The following three statements are equivalent for every 
D(A)eL(A)":
I. D(A) admits an n-person, nondictatorial, strategy proof, rational generalized SCF 
which satisfies the Pareto criterion.
II. D(A) admits an n-person nondictatorial SWF which satisfies monotonicity, IIA and
the Pareto criterion.
III. D(A) is decomposable.
This theoi em is a full characterization of the domain restrictions that admit the 
formation of nondictatorial generalized social choice functions which are strategy proof 
and Pareto optimal. That is, if one constructs a decomposable domain, he/she can obtain a 
rational generalized social choice function defined on this domain satisfying 
nondictatoriality, strategy proofness and the Pareto criterion, moreover any rational 
generalized social choice function that satisfies nondictatoriality, strategy proofiiess and 
Pareto criterion turns out to have a decomposable domain. As one can guess single- 
peaked domains ai e decomposable. This will be shown in our analysis of the single-peaked 
domains. Now having completed the characterization of the domain restrictions we will 
analyze the alternative ways to get rid of the impossibility problem in dominant strategy 
implementation.
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There are some additional comments about decomposibility. The first one is its 
being designed for the preference domains that are subsets of linear orders. That is, the 
whole characterization depends on the preferences satisfying the properties of linear 
orders. One can build a social choice function that is formed on a domain that is not a 
subset of linear orders (and thus is not decomposable) and is both strategy proof and 
nondictatorial. The following is an example of this.
Example 1:
Let F;D(A)xn->AV be a GSCF where A={a,b,c}, N={ 1,2}, D(A)=Di(A)xD2(A).
Let Di(A)={R,Oj for ieN. Define R as albPc (i.e R is indifferent between a and b and 
both are strictly preferred to c) and Q as cPalb (i.e Q strictly prefers c to both a and b and 
is indifferent between a and b).
Define F as follows;
F(R,R;A)=a F(R,R;{a,b})=a F(R,R;{a,c})=a
F(R,Q;A)=a F(R,Q;{a,b})=a F(R,Q;{a,c})=a
F(Q,R;A)=a F(Q,R;(a,b) )=a F(Q,R;{a,c})=a
F(Q,Q;A)=c F(Q,Q;{a,b})=b F(Q,Q;{a,c})=c
Now F is strategy-|)roof and nondictatorial.
F(R,R;{b,c})=a
F(R,Q;{b,c})=b
F(Q,R;{b,c})=b
F(Q,Q;{b,c})=c
In the above example though the domain is not decomposable (since it is not a 
subset of the linear orders), the social choice function formed on it satisfies both strategy 
proofness and nondictatoriality.
Another weakness of the decomposable domains is that: though it drives out the 
dictatorial social choice functions, most of the social choice functions formed on 
decomposable domains distribute the decision power among two agents, the other agents 
have no decision power at all. This kind of a social choice function, though nondictatorial, 
is not so much satisfactory. Thus, additional properties, such as essentiality and symmetry 
(essentiality is the case where for each agent there exists a profile where he/she can affect 
the outcome by changing his/her declaration; symmetry is simply anonymity, i.e. any 
permutation of a preference profile should lead to the same outcome), are imposed on
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decomposable domains. More can be found about this subject in the 1983 paper of Blair 
and Muller[3].
3.2.2 Nash Implementation
The second path followed in the task of getting rid of the impossibility problem in 
implementation is changing the equilibrium concept. The historical development of the 
literature shows that after the limitations necessary and sufficient to characterize domains 
that admit the construction of a strategy proof social choice fijnction were characterized, 
the scientists that found this too limiting for the preference domain tried another 
equilibrium concept. The main path followed was the trial of Nash implementation, 
leaving aside dominant strategy implementation. Much of the work done on this subject is 
very recent, the main developments were obtained in the end of eighties and the beginning 
of nineties. To gain a better understanding of the literature and the theorems that will be 
presented, we must constRict the additional framework necessary for this task.
Definition: (Nash equilibrium of a normal form game)
Let ReD(A), S be the Cartesian product of strategy spaces of the individuals, and let 
Tt:S->A be the outcome function of the game. Then, given a normal form game 
h[R]=(S,Ji), s*€S is said to be a Nash equilibrium of h[R] (and is formally written as 
s*eao(h[R])) if for all icN  and for all sieSi, 7i(Si*,s.i*)Ri 7t(si ,s.i*). ao(h[R]) is defined as 
the set o f all Nash equilibria of the normal form game h[R],
That means, given that the other agents play their Nash strategies, individual i 
can’t be better of by deviating from his/her Nash strategy.
Definition: (Implementation in Nash equilibrium)
Let F:D(A)—>A be a SCR and let h=(S,Tc) be a mechanism where 7t:S->A. We say that h 
fu lly  {weaklyj implemeiils F in Nash Equilihrium if for all R gD(A), F(R)=Ti(ao(h[R]))
30
{7t(oo(h[R]))^F(R) }. F is said to be Nash itnplemeniable if there exists a mechanism h 
which implements F fully in Nash equilibrium.
While all the main theorems in the literature are on full implementation, weak 
implementation is also an important concept. The main point in weak implementation is 
obtaining a subset of the socially desirable outcomes (which are collected in the set F (R )) 
and to leave aside socially undesirable ones. This is the reason for the mechanism to obtain 
a subset of F(R). A\F(R) is simply the socially undesirable alternatives. Moreover, one can 
always obtain a mechanism that implements a social choice rule in a way that for all 
ReD(A), F(R)eTr(ao(h[R])) though this is of no value in terms of implementing the 
socially desirable outcomes. Such a mechanism is illustrated in the following example.
Example 2:
Take any F:D(A)—>A with #N>3. Take the mechanism h=(S,7t) as the following:
Forany ieN, Si=! (R‘ ,a')eD(A)x.A / a'GF(R') } and for any seS,
7t(s) = a if there is an ReD(A) s.t. aeF(R) and there is an Ic N  with #I=n-l s.t. for
all ie l, Si=(R,a)
= a' otherwise
Then s*eS is a Nash equilibrium if for all isN , S j*= (R ,a)
ThenF(R)c7i(ao(h[R]))
Deflnition: (Lower contour set, upper contour set)
Given a preference R eO  and alternative ae A, the lower contour set o f  a w.r.t. R  is simply 
L(a,R)={xGA/ aRx }. Moreover, the upper contour set o f  a w.r.t. R  is U(a,R)={yeA / 
yRa }.
Additional to these, for a normal form game , h[R]=(S,Ti), and for a strategy tuple 
seS, define 7r(Sj, s.; )={xgA / there is a Si’eSi s.t. ■7i(si’,s.i)=x}
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Defînition: ( Monotonie SCR )
A SCR F:D(A)—>A is said to be monotonie if for all R, R’eD(A) and for all a s  A, 
{aeF(R) and L(a.Ri)cL(a,Rj’ ) for all ieN  }implies aeF(R ’).
This simply means that an alternative that is chosen as the social optimal under a 
profile R should also be chosen as the social optimal under the profile R ’ if its rank in the 
preference ordering of the individuals doesn’t worsen while passing fi'om the profile R to 
the profile R’,
Definition: ( No veto power )
A social choice rule F is said to satisfy no veto power if for all ReD(A), for all a sA  and 
for all IgN, [ aGargmaxRj for each jGN\{i} ] implies aGF(R).
The first result that will be presented belongs to E. Maskin (1977)[12], It 
constructs a relationship between Nash implementibility and monotonicity.
Theorem 1: (Maskin)
If  a SCR F:D(.A)—>A is Nash implementable then F is monotonie.
Given this theorem, one thinks whether the converse is true. This question is 
answered by Maskin’s well-known example given below.
Example 3: (A monotonie SCR which is not Nash implementable )
Take N={ 1,2.3}, A={a,b,c) and Di(A)=L(A) for each IgN.
F;D(A)—>A is s.t.
aGF(R) iff'a is top ranked by 1 
bGF(R) ifl'b is top ranked by 1
c gF(R) iff'c is Pareto optimal w.r.t. R and c is not bottom ranked by 1
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Now, F is monotonic. Take the following profiles, R*, R**, R*** as R*=[ (bca), 
(cab), (cab) ], R**=[ (abc), (cba), (cab) ], r ***=[ (bac), (abc), (abc) ] . Now 
F(R*)={b,c}, F(R**)={aj and F(R***)={b} according to the above rules.
Suppose h=(S,7i) is a mechanism Nash implementing F. Then, there is a 
s*eoo(h[R*])) s.t. 7i:(s*)=c.
Now b£7r(Si , s-i*) since s* is a Nash equilibrium of h[R*] and individual 1 
mustn’t have any incentive to deviate from his/her Nash strategy Sj*.
Suppose that ae7r(Si , s.|*). Then there exists an Si’eSi s.t. 7i(si’,s.i*)=a. But
then
a=7i(si’,s.i*)6K(ao(h[R***]))=F(R***)
which contradicts with F(R***)={b}. So, ag7i(Si, s.i*).
Suppose that cs7i(Si , s.i*). Then for all s i s S i , 7t(si, s.i*)=c. But then
c=7i(si,s.i*)e7r(ao(h[R**]))=F(R**)
which contradicts with F(R**)={aj. So cg7i(Si, S-i*).
Thus 7i(Si, s-i*)=0. This is a contradiction, so F is not Nash implementable.
So we now know that there is a one-sided relationship between Nash 
implementability and monotonicity. Monotonicity itself is not a sufiBcient condition to 
satisfy Nash implementibility. However, monotonicity and no veto power together implies 
Nash implementibility.
Theorem 2: (Maskin)
Let F;D(A)->A be a SCR where #N>3. If F is monotonic and satisfies no veto power, 
then F is Nash implementable.
33
Moreover, one can give examples showing that Nash implementibility doesn’t 
imply No veto power and No veto power doesn’t imply Nash implementibility.
At this point in history there was not a full characterization o f Nash 
implementibilily Monotonicity and No veto power were known to be sufficient, but only 
monotonicity was a necessary condition. Moreover these implications were true only for 
the case of #N>3. In case of two individuals and Pareto optimality dictatoriality occurred 
as a n ecessary and sutficient condition for Nash implementability. The following theorem 
shows this impossibility.
Theorem 3:
Let F:D(A)—>.A be a SCR with #N=2 and for all ieN , Di(A)=n. Moreover, let F be Pareto 
optimal. Then. F is Nash implementable iffF is dictatorial.
This impossibility theorem showed that if one requires Pareto optimality and if 
there are only two individuals in the society, then one surely gets a dictatorial social choice 
rule. Then, in 1990, Moore and Repullo [14] presented a full characterization o f Nash 
implementibility for the case of #N>3. This was really a path-breaking invention in the task 
ofNash implenientibility.
Theorem 4: (Moore and Repullo)
If  #N>3, then a SCR F can be implemented in Nash equilibrium iff it satisfies condition m 
given below:
Condition m: A SCR is said to satisfy condition m iff there exists a BcA and, for all 
ReD(A), aeF(R) and ieN, there is a nonempty set Ci(a,R)=Ti:(Si, s.i*) (where s*eS is a 
Nash equilibrium of the normal form game h[R ]) with aeCi(a,R)c(L(a,Ri)nB) satisfying: 
(mi) If R,R’sD(A) and asF(R) are s.t. for all isN , Ci(a,R)cL(a,Rj’) then aeF(R’)
(mii) If R,R’ eD(A) and aeF(R) are s.t. there is a beA  with beCi(a,R)cL(b,Ri’) and for 
allj?ii, BeL(b,Rj’), thenbsF (R ’)
(miii) If R’sD(A) and ceB  are s.t. for all ieN, BcL(c,Rj’) then ceF(R’)
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This is a Full characterization of Nash implementibility which came about very 
recently, in 1990. The only limitation on the characterization is its being for a society with 
a population of three or more. However, there exists another characterization which deals 
with the case of a population of two. This second characterization is at the same time with 
the one above and is shown independently with two different teams, namely Moore and 
Repullo [14] and Dutta and Sen [7]. The theorem is as follows.
Theorem 5: (Moore and Repullo , Dutta and Sen)
If #N=2, then a SCR can be implemented in Nash equilibrium iff it satisfies condition m2 
given below:
Condition m2: A SCR is said to satisfy condition m2 iff there exists a B c A  and, for all 
ReD(A), asF(R) and isN , there is a nonempty set Ci(a,R)=Ti(Si, s.;*) (where s*sS  is a 
Nash equilibrium of the normal form game h[R] ) with aeCi(a,R)c(L(a,Ri)nB) satisfying 
condition m, and additionally the below condition:
(miv) For e\ eiy R,R’sD(A), a6F(R) and a’eF(R ’), there exists some 
ceC i(a,R )oC 2(a,R) s.t. if R*eD(A) is s.t. Ci(a,R)cL(c,Ri*) and 
C2(a’,R ')cL(c,R 2*) then ceF(R*)
These two theorems bring about a full characterization of Nash implementibility. 
Thus and SCR that satisfies condition m or m2 (depending on the number o f individuals in 
the society ) surely is implementable in the Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and any SCR 
that is Nash implementable must satisfy one of these conditions (depending on the number 
of individuals in the society). This veiy recent works show that without a restriction on the 
admissible set of preferences, one can check whether a SCR is Nash implementable and 
also can construct Nash implementable social choice rules.
Thougli there is a nice characterization o f Nash implementable social choice rules, 
Nash implementation is limiting in terms of the information needed to obtain a Nash 
Equilibrium; that means, one has to know about the Nash strategies of the others in order 
to decide on whether his/her Nash strategy is the best he/she can obtain. This implies a full
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knowledge about the preferences and the strategy spaces of the other individuals. The 
second point about the Nash equilibrium is the problem of reaching the equilibrium. Nash 
equilibrium is self-enforcing, that means, no one deviates from his/her Nash strategy once 
they fall into tlie Nash equilibrium but there is no proposal embedded in the Nash concept 
about how this equilibrium will be achieved. Another point about the Nash equilibrium 
occurs whenever there are more than one equilibrium in such a case there may occur a 
coordination problem as in the famous story of O’Henry. Both players may play one of 
their Nash strategies that lead to different Nash equilibria and the result o f such an 
uncoordinated play may be the worst outcome that may occur. These are the main reasons 
that led the scientists first to try dominant strategy implementation of social choice rules. 
However, if one finds the domain restrictions that characterize dominant strategy 
implementable social choice ailes to be very restrictive, Nash implementation always 
occurs as an alternative way of implementation.
3.2.3 Socia! Choice Correspondences
Since the implementation task in social choice functions ( if the domain is not 
restricted to be a decomposable one) hits the walls of impossibility, one can wonder 
whether using social choice correspondences instead is a solution to this problem. Another 
reason is the cuiiosity about the reason of why one can extend the analysis to social choice 
correspondences in case of Nash implementation while for strategy proofhess (dominant 
strategy implementation) he/she is limited to social choice functions. There is not much 
literature about this business since in the strategy proofness concept the outcome is what 
matters and to display the manipulation of a social choice rule one needs functions whose 
values are definite outcomes. Thus a social choice function differs from a social welfare 
function which it resembles in most other respects, since a social welfare function doesn’t 
have to have a single maximum.
In case of social choice correspondences strategy proofness looses its meaning. 
Since the preferences of the individuals are defined on the alternatives rather then groups 
of alternatives, the question of evaluation of an outcome relative to another remains open.
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Though one cnn propose ways to derive new preferences (that are binary relations on the 
power set of the alternative set) from the preferences on single alternatives, the question 
of in which degree these reflect the true preferences of the agents remain open. Moreover 
one can define a social choice correspondence as a function where the individuals directly 
have preferences over the subsets of tlie alternative set and the social choice fianction, 
F’:D (n)—>n derived from the social choice correspondence F:D(A)->A is used instead o f 
the social choice correspondence F.
Another important point is that a dominant strategy implementable social choice 
correspondence turns out to be singleton-valued when the preferences are restricted to be 
a subset of linear orders on .4. This result will be demonstrated as a proposition below.
These are the main points that lead the literature to deal only with social choice 
functions instead of taking social choice correspondences into account. Thus, this section 
will demonstrate an analysis of social choice correspondences instead of proposing a 
solution to the impossibility problem in implementation.
While dealing with social choice correspondences there occur many questions in 
mind which we will try to answer here. The first one is about the effect o f the preference 
domain in determination of whether a dominant strategy implementable social choice 
correspondence is singleton-valued or not. The below proposition proves that if the 
preference domain is restricted to be a subset of linear orders on A, then a dominant 
strategy implementable social choice correspondence turns out to be singleton-valued.
Proposition:
Let F:D(A)^.'\ be a SCC where for all ieN, Di(A)cL(A). Now, if F is dominant strategy 
implementable, then F is singleton-valued.
proof: Assume that F is dominant strategy implementable and let h=(S,7i) be the 
mechanism implementing F in DSE.
Suppose F is not singleton-valued. Then there is an ReD(A) s.t. F(R) is not a 
singleton. Now F(R)=7i(a(h[R])).
Take any ao,a„eF(R) s.t. ao^ ^^ a,,.
Now there are s,qea(h[R]) s.t. 7t(s)=ao and 7i(q)=an.
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Take the sequence 7t(si,S2,...,s„)=a„, Ti(qi,S2,...,s„)=ai, . . . ,  7i(qi,...,q„)=a„.
Now for any keN both Sk and q^  are dominant strategies. Thus k must be indifferent 
among the outcomes a n  and a^  because of the antisymmetry property of linear orders. 
Since this holds for all keN, ao.-^ a,,. but this contradicts with Zo^aa . Thus the supposition is 
wrong and F is singleton-valued.
QED.
Anothe" ([uestion that arises is whether the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is still 
valid with social choice correspondences. Now since the preference domain can be taken 
as a full domain of complete preorders in the impossibility theorem we do not need to 
have singleton-\ allied social choice correspondences. Moreover if one checks Gibbard’s 
proof of the impossibility theorem, he/she can see that it is based on social welfare 
functions and implementation in dominant strategy equilibrium. This brings the intuition 
that the Gibbard-vSatterthwaite theorem can be extended to hold for dominant strategy 
implementibility of social choice correspondences. This is achieved in the following 
chapter, in page fifty. This means that using social choice correspondences doesn’t let us 
to get rid of impossibility in implementation.
Another question in mind is whether the individuals are indifferent among the 
elements of the outcome set, F(R). That means, if a social choice correspondence is 
dominant strategy implementable is it utilitywise singleton? Unfortunately one can find 
examples in which there is an individual who strictly prefers an element of the outcome set 
to another. The following example illustrates this.
Example 4:
Let F be a SCC as follows. F:D(A)—>A is s.t. A={a,b}, N={1,2} and for all ieN , 
D i(A )cn. F(R)=argmaxRi.
Now, F is implemented in DSE by the mechanism below. 
m=(S,7t:) where Si=(a,b} and S:=|a,b} and ti(si,S2)=Si.
Now for any Rf£D(A), F(R)=7t(o(m[R])), and thus m implements F in DSE. Moreover 
F(R)=(a,b I where aRib and bRia ( i.e. Ri is an indifference relation ) and b~R2a (i.e.
38
individual 2 sii ictly prefers a to b ). Here the second individual is not indifferent between a
and b and F(R')=|a,b}.
As can be seen in the above example, in case of dictatoriality there may exist 
individuals who are not indifferent among the outcomes generated by the social choice 
correspondence. What if dictatoriality is dropped? Then, for the two agents two goods 
case, we see that the individuals should be indifferent among the outcomes to achieve 
implementation in dominant strategy equilibrium.
Proposition:
Let F;D(A)—>A where A={a,bj, N=¡1,2} and for all isN , D¡(A) be a nondictatorial SCC 
which is impleinentable by a mechanism h=(S,7t) in DSE. Then for each R6D(A), for all 
ieN , individua! i is indifferent among the elements of F(R).
proof: Suppose there is an ReD(A) s.t. F(R)={a,b} and b~Ria (i.e. individual 1 strictly 
prefers a to b ). Now since h implements F in DSE, there are s°,s*’sa(h[R]) s.t. 7t(s*)=a and 
7i(s'’)=b. Now Tc(si\s2'’)=b since otherwise Si"^  would not be a dominant strategy of 
individual 1. (Fie/she would gain by deviating to Si“ from Si'’). Similarly Tt(si'’,S2*)=a. Thus, 
the outcome is independent of the first individual’s strategy. But this means that the 
second individual is a dictator of the mechanism, thus also of the SCC it implements in 
DSE. This contradicting with the assumption o f nondictatoriality implies that the 
supposition is 'vrong.
QED.
As can be seen in the above analysis, there is not a gain offered by the usage of 
social choice correspondences instead of functions. The only, above the surface, change is 
the definition of strategy proofness not holding for correspondences. However there 
occurs the same problems with dominant strategy implementability instead o f strategy 
proofness.
At this chapter it is aimed to clarify some points about the relationship among 
strategy prooFness and other concepts. While some of these relationships are intrinsically 
assumed to hold, there doesn’t exist a formal construction of these relationships in the 
literature. Moreover, this chapter introduces some new results about the characterization 
of the relationships among the concepts given, together with a new impossibility theorem 
that is extended to generalized social choice rules.
The first task is the clarification of the relationship between strategy proofhess and 
dominant strategy implementibility. Now since the set of dominant strategy mechanisms is 
broader thai'i the set of strategy proof mechanisms, one can easily find an example where 
the mechanism is strategy proof but doesn’t implement the SCR it is associated with.
Example 1: ( A strategy proof mechanism which doesn’t implement the SCF ( with 
which it is a.ssociated ) in DSE.)
Let h=(f2'\F) be a strategy proof mechanism. Now for any Rei2", Rea(h[R]).
For h to impiement F in DSE, for all RsQ" and for all B e ll , F(R,B)=F(a(h[R])) must 
hold. Take R ’ to be the preference profile where for each individual i, R,* is an 
indifference relation. Now a(h[R*])= Q" i.e. any preference profile is a dominant strategy 
equilibrium of the game h[R*]. Now F(a(h[R*]))=A but F(R’'‘) is a singleton and thus 
F(R*);i:F(a(h[R’^ ])). So h (though it satisfies strategy proofness condition) doesn’t 
implement F in DSE.
We sarv in the above example that there doesn’t have to be an equivalence relation 
between sti ategy proofness and dominant strategy implementation. This is mainly because 
of taking the preference domain as a subset o f the complete preorders on the alternative 
set, A. Now vve will claim that restricting the preference domain to the linear orders is a 
sufficient condition for this equivalence.
4 M A I N  R E S U L T S
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Proposition:
Let Di(A)cLiA) be the preference domain for each individual ieN. Let F be a social 
choice function. Now, F is strategy proof iff it is dominant strategy implementable. 
proof: Assume that F is strategy proof Now, F;D(A)-^A is said to be strategy proof if 
the associated revelation mechanism h=(D(A),F) is strategy proof That means for all 
R€D(A). R-a(h[R]).
Now suppose that F is not dominant strategy implementable. Take the mechanism 
h=(D(A),F) which also doesn’t implement F in DSE by the supposition. That means, there 
exists a proiile PsD(A) s.t. Pea(h[P]) and F(P)=co since F is strategy proof, and 
moreover there exists a QeD(A) s.t. Q;*P, Qea(h[P]) and F(Q)=Cn?^ Co.
Now take the following sequence,
F(Pi,...,P„)=Co, F(Qi,P2,...,P„)=Ci , ... , F(Qi,...,Qn)=c„.
Now since both P| and Qi are dominant strategies o f individual i, he/she must be indifferent 
between the outcomes cm and C|. But this, by antisymmetry property o f linear orders, 
implies tliat C|.|=Ci. Moreover this holds for all ieN. Thus Co=Ci=...=Cn which means that 
Co=Cn. This contradicts with thus the supposition is wrong, F is dominant strategy 
implementable.
For the converse case, assume that F is dominant strategy implementable.
Let h=(X,n:) be the mechanism implementing F in DSE. Then for all ReD(A), 
F(R)-7i(a(h[R])).
Now since h is a dominant strategy mechanism, each individual have a dominant strategy 
in the game h[R]. Call s* as a dominant strategy equilibrium of h[R].Take an individual 
ieN.
Then for all sfeXi, and any s-ieX-i, 7r(si*,s.i)Ri7r(si’.s.i).
That is , for all PieDi(A) , 7i(a(h[R]))R|7t(a(h[Pi,R.i])).
But that means, for all PieDi(A), F(R.j,Ri)R|F(R-i,Pi).
Since this hold.s for all ReD(A) and for all ieN, F is strategy proof
QED.
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Here, tliough restricting the preference domain is needed for strategy proofness to 
imply dominnnt strategy implementibility, this kind of a restriction is not necessary for 
dominant strategy implementibility to imply strategy proofness. That is, any social choice 
function that is dominant strategy implementable is strategy proof To extend the results 
on social choice rules to the generalized social choice rules, we first have to clarify some 
points about the concepts that will be used.
The Hi st point is about the relationship between strategy proofhess and rationality 
of a generalized social choice function. The following two examples illustrate that one of 
these concepts doesn’t imply the other to exist.
Example 2: { .A strategy proof GSCF which is not rational)
Take the imposed GSCRF:D(.A.)«ri—>A, where A={a,b,c}. construct F as
F ( . ,  A)=a
F (.,{ a ,b !)= b
F ( .,{ b .c |)= h
F ( . , {a,cj)=a
F( . ,  {x))=x for all xsA.
Now, since F is an imposed GSCF, it is strategy proof (i.e. no individual has any incentive 
to manipulate F) but it is not rational.
Example 3: (A. rational GSCF which is not strategy proof)
Let F;D(.A)> A—>,A be a rational GSCF. Let fD(A)->L(A) be the SWF associated with F. 
For each R g D(A) and B e ll, define F as F(R,B)=argminBf(R). Now, each individual has 
an incentive to change the social order via misrepresenting his/her preferences (namely 
declaring the inverse of his/her preference ordering). Thus F is not strategy proof
The second point of clarification is about the relationship of strategy proofiiess, 
rationality and the Pareto optimality of a generalized social choice function. While 
analyzing the relationship between strategy proofness and the quasi Pareto criterion we
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see that rationality is a sufficient condition for strategy proofness to imply the quasi Pareto 
criterion. We will first demonstrate an example where a social choice function, though it is 
strategy pioof, does not satisfy the quasi Pareto criterion. Then we will claim that any 
rational genei alized social choice flmction which is strategy proof is automatically quasi 
Pareto optimal.
Example 4: SCF which is strategy proof but not quasi Pareto optimal)
Let F:D(A);—>A be a social choice flinction where A={a,b,c,d}, D(A)=Di(A)xD2(A). 
Di(A)==(Ri,Qi I where aRibRicRid and bQiaQidQiC and D2(A)={R2,Q2} where 
dR2bR2cR2a and bQ2dQ2aQ2C. That is, both individuals have two alternative linear orders 
on the set A. Moi eover F is as below;
F(R i,R2)=c
F(Ri,Q2)=a
F(Qi,R2)=d
F(Qi,Q2)-b
Now F is easily checked to be strategy proof. Moreover F doesn’t satisfy the quasi Pareto 
criterion since there exists a profile, (R|,R2), where each individual strictly prefers the 
alternative, b, to the outcome of the SCF at that profile, c. Thus F, though it is strategy 
proof, doesn't satisfy the quasi Pareto criterion. Now we will claim that the rationality is a 
sufficient condition for this implication.
Proposition:
Let F;D(A)xrt—>.A be a GSCF. If F is strategy proof and rational then F satisfies the Quasi 
Pareto Criterion.
proof: Let F:D(A)xn->A be a strategy proof and rational GSCF. Suppose that F doesn’t 
satisfy the Quasi Pareto criterion. Then there exists a profile ReD(A) and x ,y eB eIl s.t. 
for all ieN, xRiy and y~Rjx is satisfied and F(R,B)=y. Define B’={x,y).
Now since F is rational F(R,B’)=y. Moreover since x eB ’, there exists an R’eD(A) s.t. 
F(R’,B’)=x. Define the sequence Fi),...,F„ as follows
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Fo=F( (R,.....R„), B’)=y , F,=F( (R ,\R ,..... R„), B’) , ... , Fk=F( (R,’,...,Rk’,Rk.i,...,R„). B’),
andF„=F((R,·.....R„’) ,B ’)=x
Now there exi.'^ it.s an individual ksN  s.t. F|;=x and Fu t x^ which means Fk-i=y.
ThusFkRkFk-, i.e. F( ( R , R k ’,Rk-„.. ,R„), B’)RkF( (R,’.... Rk,Rk.i,...,Rn), B’)
which implie.s that Rk is not a dominant strategy for k. But this in turn means that F is not a 
strategy proof GSCF. This leads to a contradiction, so F satisfies the quasi Pareto 
criterion.
QED.
The iast iroint of clarification about strategy proof generalized social choice 
functions is on the relationship between strategy proofness and some of the Arrow’s 
conditions. Ti'is relationship, though proved independently by us, was shown to be true by 
Blin and Satierthwaite [5] and Blair and Muller [3]. The idea is summarized in the 
following proposition.
Proposition:
Let F;D(A)xr[— be a rational GSCF and let f  be the SWF associated with F. Then F is 
strategy proof itTf satisfies monotonicity and IIA.
proof: Assinre tliat f  satisfies monotonicity and IIA conditions. Suppose that F is not 
strategy proof Then there exists an isN  s.t. i can manipulate F at profile PeD(A) and 
feasible set B by playing Q;. This means that there are x,yeB s.t. x=F(P,B), y=F(P-i,Qi, B) 
and yPjX. This, by rationality, implies that xf(P)y and yf(P.i,Qi)x.
If yQjX then since initially there was yP|X, the assumption of IIA is violated.
If xQiy then the assumption of monotonicity is violated since i’s changing Jfrom yPjX to 
xQy (i.e. increasing the rank of x in his/her preference ordering) leads x not to be chosen.
For the converse part assume that F is strategy proof 
Case 1; Suppose f  is not monotonic.
Then there are R.R’sD (A ), B sII and xeB s.t. for C=B\{x}
(i) R and R' agree on C
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(ü) For all ieX , and for all yeC, xRiv implies that xRi’y
(iii) x=argmaxiif( R)
and x?i:argma\'nf(R’)=z where z g C.
Now argmaxnf(R)=x ,by rationality, implies that argmax {x.z!f(R)=x.
So xf(R)z but zf(R’)x i.e.
fo=argmax ¡x.^ ; IT R, R„)=x , f=argmax.x.z}f(Ri ’,R2, ...,Rn),··.,f„=argmaX{x,z}f(Ri··.,Rn’)=z
Then there is a k;=N s.t. fk=z and fk.i=x i.e. if k plays Rk x is chosen and if k plays Rk’ z is 
chosen.
Suppose xRkZ is the case. But this implies xRk’z and while all the preferences are constant 
the outcome changes then. (This will be shown to be implied by strategy proofness in one
of the follow ing propositions)
So x~RkZ is the case. Now it may be that x~Rk’z, but the same contradiction above occurs 
in this case. So xRk’z. But then player k can manipulate F at profile R and feasible set 
{x,z} by playing R|-’. But this contradicts with the assumption that F is strategy proof. So f  
is monotonie.
Case 2: Suppose ('doesn’t satisfy IIA .
That is, there are P,QgD(A) which agree on a B e ll, but x=F(P,B)7i:F(Q,B)=y, 
i.e. x=argmaxp,f( P)?^argmaxBf(Q)=y 
Now form the sequence
fo=argmaxBf(P)=x , f,=argmaxBf(Qi,P2.....Pn), .··, f„=argmaxf(Qi,...,Qn)=y
Now there is a kçN  s.t. Fk=y and Fk-i^y.
Since P and Q agree on B, for all x,yeB, (xPky iff xQky) and (yPkX iff yQkx) must hold. 
But then monotonicity which was shown to be implied by strategy proofhess and 
rationality is violated. (This is because the social choice changes from x to y though no 
preference changes from fk to tl-i). This means that the above supposition leads to a 
contradiction. Thus f  satisfies. IIA.
QED.
Having clarified relationships among the main concepts that are related with 
strategy proof social choice functions we now can extend the characterization of the
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relationship between strategy proofness and dominant strategy implementibility to the 
generalized social choice rules. While doing this task, to maintain a relationship among the 
mechanisms, each of which implements the generalized social choice rule for a certain 
subset of A, i.s an important criteria. Though it is possible to show that there exists a class 
of mechanism;; (the elements o f which are not necessarily related with each other) which 
implements a ;M i ategy proof generalized social choice function (and vice versa), this kind 
of a characterization does not tell much about how to obtain that specific class of 
mechanisms. Thus, the concepts of ‘total implementation” and ‘jiseudo implementation” 
are introduced. This, specifically, makes the characterization wider and more powerful.
As a J esuit of the above reasons, we will first introduce a characterization about 
the relationship between strategy proofness and pseudo implementation. Then we will 
generalize it to total implementabilify and to a characterization of the equivalence among 
all these related concepts.
Lemma:
Let F;D(A)x 11—>A be a GSCF, where for all ieN, D;(A)eL(A). Now F is strategy proof 
ififF is pseudci implementable in DSE.
proof: Firstly assume that F is strategy proof Take the class o f mechanisms 
m={mB=(D(A).F;!) / B ell}  where for all ReD(A), Fb(R)=F(R,B)s B.
Suppose F is not pseudo implementable in DSE. Then, specifically, the class m doesn’t 
pseudo implement F. This means that there is a B e l l  s.t. mB=( D(A), Fb) doesn’t pseudo 
implement F( . ,B) in DSE relative to B.
Now Rea(mn[R]) since for all Q.ieD.i(A) and PisDi(A), F(Ri,Q.i ,B)RjF(Pi,Q.i ,B) by 
strategy proofness of F. But this means that FB(Ri,Q-i)RiFB(Pi,Q.i).
CallFB(R)=c„. Then FB(o(mB[R]))3FB(R)={co}.
Now since F is not implementable in DSE by supposition, there is a PeD(A) s.t. 
Pea(mB[R]) and FB(P)=c„5iCo.
Now take the following sequence,
Fb(R i,·. ,Rii)-t:!' , · , FB(Pl,...,Pk,Rk-l, •,Rn)~Cic , ... , FB(Pl,...,Pn)=Cn
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Now take any ksN , Since the only difference between the strategy profiles leading to Ck-i 
and Ck is individual k’s strategy ( Rk for c n  and Pk for Ck ) and since both are his/her 
dominant straiegies he/she must be indifferent among the outcomes Ck-i and Ck. But since 
his/her preference relation is a linear order, by antisymmetry of linear orders Ck-i=Ck.
Since this holds for all keN, C(i=Ci=...=c„ which means Co=Cn.
But this contradicts with Co^ c^,,.
So F is pseudo implemented by the class m in DSE.
For the converse assume that F is pseudo implementable in DSE. Then, there’s a 
class of mechanisms h={hB=(Sii,7tu) / B ell}  s.t. for all B e fl, hß pseudo implements F( . 
,B) in DSE relative to B. That is, for all RgD(A), F(R,B)=Kß(o(hB[R])).
Now, we want to show that for all B efl, for all ReD(A), and for all PieD;(A), 
F(R.i,Ri,B)RiF:R.i,Pi,B).
Take any Bg I’I. Rs D(A), PjGDi(.A). Take any s*ea(hB[R]) and any ieN.
Now since Si* is a dominant strategy of i Tc(Si*,s.i*)Ri7t(Si,s.i*) for any SisSB,i(Si*).
Take the two ¡^seudo games hi.i[R] and hit[R-i,Pi].
Now for all jGN\!i}, sj* which was a dominant strategy of j in hß[R] is still a dominant 
strategy in h|![R.;,Pi]. Since 7tH(a(hB[R-i,Pi]))=F(R.i,Pi,B)?i0, there still exists a dominant 
strategy for i in hn[R_i,Pi]. Take s'ea(hn[R_i,Pi]) s.t. for all jeN\{i}, Sj’=Sj*. Then there 
exists an Si’sSii.i(s-i’) s.t. (si’,s.i’)=(Si’,s.i*)ea(hB[R-i,Pi]).
Now since 7t(s,*,.s.i*)Ri7i(si,s.i*) for all SiGSß.iis.j*),
7i(Si*,s-i*)Ri7i(si’,s.i*) since Si’eSB.i(s.i*).
But this means that 7t(a(hB[R]))Ri7i(a(hn[R.i,Pi])), and is equivalent to saying 
F(R,B)RiF(R-i.Pi ,B). Thus F is strategy proof
QED.
Though this lemma brings a full characterization of the relationship between 
strategy proofness and pseudo im|)lementability in dominant strategies, pseudo 
implementability is a new concept and in some terms weaker than the property of 
implementabilit\’. Because of this reason, a full characterization of the relationships
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between stratcLw i^roofness and other concepts can’t be considered to be completed. Thus, 
with the help of the following proposition, a full characterization of these relationships will 
be given in an equivalence theorem which will relate strategy proofhess, pseudo 
implementabihty, implementability and total implementability all together.
Proposition:
Let F:D(.A)xn—>.4 be a strategy proof GSCF where Di(A)cL(A) for each isN . Let 
R,Q gD(A) be s.t. Rb=Qb for some B s f l  (where Rb is the restriction o f the profile R on 
the set B). Then F(R,B)=F(Q,B), 
proof: Suppose that F(R,B)i!iF(0,B).
Take F(R,B)=a.isB and F(Q,B)=a„eB s.t. anTta,,.
Now form the following sequence,
F(R,B)=a„.... F(Oi,...,Qk ,Rk-i.....R,.)=ak ,···, F(Q,B)=a„ where {ao,ai,...,an}cB.
Now, for an>' individual, k, at profile (Qi,...,Qk-i ,Rk ,- -,Rn) , there must be ak-iRfcak by 
strategy proofi’ess.
Moreover, at profile (Qi,...,Qk -Rk-i ,. ..,Rn), akQkak-i for the same reason.
But since botl'i ni;.i and ak are in B and since R and Q completely agree on B, 
ak-iRkak implies ak-iQkakand akQkak-i implies akRkak-i.
This means that, in both profiles R and Q, individual k is indifferent between ak-i and ak. 
Thus, by the antisymmetry property of the linear orders, ak=ak-i.
Since this holds for any ksN , a()=ai=,.,=a„ which implies ao=a„.
But this conti-adicts with the supposition, thus the supposition, is wrong. Thus 
F(R,B)=F(Q,B).
QED.
This theorem is a full characterization of the relationships among strategy 
proofness and all the introduced implementation concepts.
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Theorem:
Let F:D(A)xri—>A be a GSCF where Di(A)cL(A) for each isN . Now, the followings are 
equivalent:
(i) F is strateg)· proof
(ii) F is pseudo implementable in dominant strategies.
(iii) F is impleoientable in dominant strategies.
(iv) F is totallv implementable in dominant strategies, 
proof:
(i) iffOi):
This v\ rs shown to be true by the above lemma.
(ii) i f  (iv) and (Hi) i f  (iv):
These ,'^ imply hold by definition of total implementation.
(i^) i f  (i):
Assume that F is a strategy proof GSCF. Define the class m={mB=(D(B),FB / 
B e n )  as D(B)=D|(B)x...xD„(B) where Di(B) is the restriction of Di(A) on B and 
Fb:D(B)—>B is s.i. Fb(Rb)=F(R,B) for any RntD(B) ( which is the restriction ofR6D (A ) 
on B).
Now Ft; is a well-defined function as a result of the preceding proposition. If the 
proposition was not true, there could be a case where F(R,B) would not be equal to 
F(Q,B) while Rb=Qb This wotild leave to a contradiction as follows; 
Fb(Rb)=F(R,B );6F(Q,B)=Fb(Qb)=F|3(Rb). Thus, the above proposition is essential for mto 
be a well-defined mechanism class.
Suppose that F is not totally implementable. This specifically means that the 
mechanism cla,ss m doesn’t implement F. Then there exists a subset B of A s.t ma doesn’t 
implement F ( . ,B) in dominant strategy equilibrium.
Now since F is strategy proof for all ReD(A), for all isN  and for all QiSD(A), 
F(Ri ,R.i,B)RiF(Q| ,R.i ,B). This is equivalent to Fb(Ri,b ,R-j .B)RiFB(Qi,B,R-i3).
This means that Rb is a dominant strategy equilibrium of itib[R], i.e. RB6a(mB[R])· Call 
Fb(Rb) =Cii. Now, co=Fb(Rb)c  FB(o(mB[R])). That is, since iub doesn’t implement F ( . ,B)
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by supposition, there exists an PHGa(mu[R]) s.t. Pb^ Rb and FB(PB)=Cn?^ Co .Form the 
following sequence,
Fb(Ri,B ,-..,Rn.r!)-Co Fb(Pi.B, ■,P|c,U .Rk-I,B .•••,Rn,B)'=Ck Fb(Pi,B ,.".Pn,B)~Cn .
Then siiice for all ieN, Ri.n and P|,b are dominant strategies of ieN, and both Ri 
and Pi are in L(.A.), Ci.i=Ci by the anti.symmetiy property of linear orders. That implies 
Co=Ci=.. .=c„ vvhicli in turn means that Cd=c„ contradicting with Co^ C^n. Thus the supposition 
is wrong and F is totally implementable (specifically by the class m).
(i) i f  (Hi):
Assume that F is implementable in dominant strategies. Then there exists a class of 
mechanisms h=(hB=(SB ,tib) ! BgFI} that implements F in dominant strategies. That 
means, for eacii BgFI. a mechanism, hn. implements F (. ,B) in dominant strategies.
That is, for all RgD(A), F(R,B)=7tu(a(hi,[R])).
Now, we want to show that for all Be FI, for all ReD(A), and for all PjeDi(A),
F(R.i,R, ,B)R,FfR-i,Pi ,B).
Take any BeFI. ReD(A), PieDi(A). Take any s*ea(hB[R]) and any isN.
Now since Si* i s  a dominant strategy of i 7i:(Si*,s.i*)Ri7c(Si,s.i*) for any SieSB,i(si*).
Take the two games hsiR] and hH[R.i,Pi].
Now for all jeN\(i), sj* which was a dominant strategy of j in hB[R] is still a dominant 
strategy in hp.| R-i,Pi]. Since 7iB(cT(hB[R-i,Pi]))=F(R_i,Pi,6)7^0, there still exists a dominant 
strategy for i in liB[R.i,Pi]. Take s'eG(liB[R-i,Pi]) s.t. for all jeN\{i}, sj’=Sj*. Then there 
exists an si’G$u,i(.s-i’) s.t. (si’,s.i’)=(Si’,s.,*)ea(hB[R-i,Pi]).
Now since 7T(si*.s.|*)Ri7t(Si,s.i*) for all SieSB.i(s.i*),
7l(S;*,S .i*)R i7t(Si’,S-i*) since Si’ eSB.i(s.i*).
But this means that Tc(a(hB[R]))Ri7i(a(hB[R-i,Pi])), and is equivalent to saying 
F(R,B)RiF(R_i,Pj ,B). Thus F is strategy proof
Now, via the above implications which are proven to be true, any of the four 
concepts imply any other. Thus the equivalence holds.
QED.
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One pi oblem with this characterization is its being designed for the domains that 
are subsets o f linear orders. However, since it is shown that in case of the lack o f this 
assumption strategy proofness doesn't necessarily imply implementability, this is not a 
main problem. One other result of tliis restriction is , as it was shown in the section for 
social choice correspondences, that a dominant strategy implementable social choice 
correspondence turns out to be singleton-valued when the preference domain is restricted 
to be a subset of the linear orders. Moreover, when the preference domain is not restricted 
to be a subset of linear orders, the indi\ iduals need not be indifferent among the outcomes 
of a dominant .“Strategy implementable social choice correspondence (This was also shown 
in the section niuxit social choice correspondences).
Leaving the preference domain unrestricted (to be a subset of linear orders ) 
creates an additional problem. In such a situation, two profiles that agree on a subset of 
the alternative set does not necessarily lead to the same outcome. The following is an 
example of such a situation.
Example 5: f ,\ strategy proof and rational GSCF which doesn’t satisfy the equivalent 
outcomes ■'■•roperty of the agreeing profiles)
Let F;D(A)xri—>A be a GSCF where A=[a,b,c}, N={ 1,2}, D(A)=Di(A)xD2(A).
Let Di(A)={R.Q} for isN . Define R as albPc (i.e R is indifferent between a and b and 
both are strictly i)ieferred to c) and Q as cPalb (i.e Q strictly prefers c to both a and b and 
is indifferent between a and b).
Define F as follows:
F(R,R;A)=a F(R,R;ia,b;)=a F(R,R;{a,c})=a F(R,R;{b,c))=a
F(R,Q;A)=a F(R,Q;(a,bj)-a F(R,Q;{a,c})=a F(R,Q;{b,c})=b
F(Q,R;A)=a F(Q,R;{a,bi )=a F(Q,R;{a,c})=a F(Q,R;{b,c})=b
F(Q,Q;A)=c F(Q,Q;{a,b))=b F(Q,Q;{a,c})=c F(Q,Q;{b,c})=c
Now, F is strategy proof, rational, nondictatorial. Moreover, though (Q,R){a,b}= (Q,Q){a.b} 
F(Q,R,{a,bJ)=F(Q,Q,{a,b}).
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The existence of such a situation leads to the necessity of an additional assumption 
about tlie case iii tlie following impossibility theorem which is a generalization o f the 
Gribbard-Sattenhwaite theorem for generalized social choice rules. The example also 
shows that the characterization of decomposable domain is of no use when the preference 
domain is not restricted to be a subset of linear orders.
The following theorem is a generalization of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 
for generalized social choice rules. It rec|uires the additional assumptions of rationality and 
that the outcomes generated by the two agreeing profiles should be the same on that 
specific subset of the alternative set.
Theorem:
Let F:D(,A)xri->.A be a rational G.SCC where the cardinality of A is greater than or equal 
to three, D(A)=L(A)" or D(A)= G". .Assume that for any R,QsD(A) s.t. Rb=Qb for some 
B e ll, F(R,B)=F(Q,B). (Note that this assumption is not necessary when D(A)=L(A)"). 
Then F is pseudo implementable in dominant strategies iffF is dictatorial, 
proof: First assume that F is pseudo implementable. We will show that the associated 
SWF, f  of F satisfies all Arrow’s conditions except nondictatoriality. Then using Arrow’s 
theorem, we will claim that f is dictatorial. Finally we will show that this implies F to be 
dictatorial.
Claim I : f satisfies IIA.
proof: Suppose f  doesn’t satisfy ILA. Then there exist x,yeA and P,QsD(A) s.t. P and
Q agree on {x.yf and f(P) and f(Q) doesn’t agree on {x,y}.
W.I.o.g. assume that xf(P)y and x~f(Q)y. That means, argmaX{x,y>f(P)?i: 
argmax(x,y>f(Q) which implies F(P,(x,y})7iF(Q, {x,y}). But this contradicts with the above 
assumption. Thus the supposition is wrong, f  satisfies IIA.
Claim 2: f  satisfies monotonicity.
proof: Suppose f  is not monotonic Then, there are R,R’sD(A), B e ll, xeB  s.t. for
C=B\{xi.
(i) Rc=R'(·
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(ii) For all Ig N, lor all yGC, xRiV implies xR’i
(iii) xGarymax!;f(R) 
and xgargmaxi>.l'(R’).
Take any z€argmaxnf(R’). Now, by rationality, xGargmaX(x,z)f(R) and z=argmaX{x,z}f(R’)· 
For any kG {0....Ill, define the profile R*^ =(R’i,...,R’k,Ri;v|,...R„). Now form the following 
sequence,
fo=argmaX|x.z|f(R''), ...,fk=argmax|x.z;f(R''),...,fi,=argmaX{.x.z}f(R") where xGfo and z= f,.
Now, there exists a kGN s.t. xGf'k.i and z=fk .That is,
X G a rgma X; x.z I f( R*^ ’' )=F (R*^ ' ’, {x, z }) 
z = argmax;x.z)f(R'^)=F(R\{x,z})
Since F is pse''do implementable, there is a pseudo game form h=(S,7i) which implements 
F relative to |': .z |. Moreover, xG;t(G(h[R''·'])) and z=Tt(a(h[R'^])).
From h[R''·'] to h[R‘'] the only thing that changes is agent k’s preference relation on {x,z}. 
That means, there exists an s.k^eS.k where for all ¡GN\{k}, Sj* is a dominant strategy of i; 
moreover, there exists an Sk'eSk s.t. n:(Sk\s-k*)=x and there exists an Sk^eSk s.t. 7i(sk^s. 
k*)=z. Since X G Tt(a(h[R'^])), Sk'^  is not a dominant strategy of k with the preference relation 
R’k , i.e. zP’kX (where P’k is the strict preference relation derived from R ’k). But this, by 
assumption (ii ■ implies that zPkX (where Pk is the strict preference relation derived from 
Rk). Then. R;.x.z[=R’{.x.z} which implies that F(R,{x,z})=F(R’,{x,z}). That means 
argmax;x,/,'f(R)=argmaX{x,z>f(R’) contradicting with the supposition. Thus f  is monotonic.
Now f satisfies the following conditions:
(i) Cardinality of A is greater than or equal to three.
(ii) f  is monotonic.
(iii) f  satisfies HA.
Thus, by Arrow’s impossibility theorem, f  is dictatorial.
To show that F is dictatorial, let dGN be the dictator for f  Now since d is a 
dictator for f. for all R gD(A), f(R)=R<i. That implies, for all R gD(A), for all B gH,
03
argmaxBf(R)=aigmaxBR<i whicli is equivalent to saying F(R,B)= argmaxeRj . Thus deN  is 
a dictator for F; thus, F is dictatorial.
For the reverse implication assume that F is a dictatorial GSCC. Let deN  be a 
dictator for F. Now, for all ReD(.A), foi' all Be FT, F(R,B)=argmaxBR<i.
Take the following class h=|hB=(SB,jrB) / BeFI} s.t. for all ieN , Si,B=B and 
7Ib(s)=s,i for any seSfi. Take any ReD(A) and B ell. Now, sea(hB[R]) iiFSde argmaxBRd- 
Thus 7tH(a(hB[R]))= argmaxBRj=F(R.B). Since this holds for all ReD(A) and B e ll ,  the 
class h pseudo implements F in dominant strategies.
QED.
The la.st theorem of this chapter is a characterization of rationality in terms of 
Hauthakker’s .Axiom. This is mainly done to gain a deeper understanding of the rationality 
condition and to be able to judge what it adds to a generalized social choice rule. It will be 
seen that the ra tionality condition is a restriction that imposes the necessity o f consistency 
among different subsets of the alternative set for a generalized social choice rule. My 
personal judgment about this concept is that rationality is a support to the concept of 
generalized social choice rules than being a restriction on them. The following theorem 
relates rationality with the famous axiom of Hauthakker.
Theorem:
Let F:D(A)xri—>A be a GSCR. Now F is rational iff for all PeD(A), F(P, . ) : H —>A 
satisfies Hauthakker’s axiom.
proof: Firstly assume that F is a rational SCC. Now by definition of rationality there is a 
SWF, fD (A )—>B(A), s.t. for all PeD(.A) and for all B e ll: F(P,B)=argmaxBf(P). Now 
since f(P)eB(A) it is a complete preorder (i.e. satisfies completeness, transitivity and 
reflexivity). Define a binary relation Ri· on A  as for all x,yeA, xRpy is satisfied iff xfCP)y 
and y~f(P)x are satisfied. Now Rp is a strict preference relation (SPR) on A. 
Define c( . , Ri'):n->2'^ as for any B e ll, c(B,Rp)={xsB / for all y sB , y~Rpx}. Now for 
any B e n .
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c(B,Rp)={xeB / for all ysB , y~Rpx}
= { x eB /fo r allysB , xf(P)y}
=argmaxMf(P)
=F(P,B)
To complete the proof, we will use the following lemma:
Lemma:
Let c’;ri—>0 be a choice function. Then the followings are equivalent.
(i) There is a f  PR, Rp on A s.t. for all B efl, c’(B)=c(B,Rp )
(ii) c’ satisfies H.A
Now . , Rp) is equivalent to a choice function since it is nonempty valued as 
shown above. Thus the first condition of the above lemma is satisfied. But this implies that 
the choice function c’ which is nothing but F(P, . ) here satisfies HA. Since this holds for 
all admissible i'- oflles PgD(A) the only if part of the proof is completed.
For the if part of the proof assume that for all PeD(A), F(P, . ) :I l-> n  satisfies 
HA. Then, by the above lemma there is an SPR, S, on A s.t. for all B e ll , F(P,B)==c(B,S) 
where c(B,S)=l.\eB)={xeB / for all y^B, y~S.\}. Then 
F(P,B)=c(B,S)={xeB /fo r all yeB.  y~~Sxl 
= l x e B /  for all yeB, xf(P)y!
=argmaxBf(P)
Since this holds for all PeD(A). f  D(.A)->B(.A) can be defined to be a SWF. Thus F is 
rational.
QED.
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5 AN IXAMPLE OF DOiVIAIN RESTRICTION IN
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS
One of' the most striking applications of the social choice theory in economic 
theory is alloca tion rules. These rules, given the preferences and the endowments of the 
individuals, re-allocate these endowments among the individuals in such a way to 
maximize a gi\ en objective. Moreover, Walrasian equilibrium is one of the most famous 
types of equilibi ia for pure exchange economies (PEE) in economic theory. But in the 
achievement of the Walrasian equilibria it’s presumed that an invisible hand knows the true 
utilities of the agents and sets the optimal price for exchange to occur in the economy. 
This can also be thought as the case where each agent knows all about the others and the 
agents (who aic thought to be wise enough to achieve this) together determine a price to 
achieve a final allocation which satisfies certain optimality conditions.
But the question of what can be achieved in case of incomplete information (this 
can be thougbi! of as the unexistence of an invisible hand or simply the case of individuals 
being unaware of the preferences of the others) there occur problems in the achievement 
of the Walrasian equilibria, Hurwicz in 1972 showed that the Walrasian equilibria are 
manipulable via one agent atfecting the prices through misrepresenting his/her true 
preferences wlien the information is not complete and the number of agents in the 
economy is tinite [10]. Though Postlewaite and Roberts in 1976 showed that the gains 
from manipulation can be limited to a given amount for a big enough number of 
replications of the economy, there still exists gains from manipulation unless there are an 
infinite numbei' of agents in the economy.
Since the Walrasian equilibria can’t be obtained through decentralization of the 
system, one searches for alternative procedures through which the decentralization of the 
system doesn’t lead to individual manipulation. This can be achieved via a mechanism 
which implements a strategy proof allocation rule in DSE. Barbera and Jackson in 1993 
obtained such a mechanism which they call as a fixed-price trading(for the case o f two 
individuals) or a fixed-proportions trading (a more general terminology for the case of
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more than two individuals) meclianisni [1]. Moreover they showed that the only way to 
implement strategy proof allocation rules (social choice rules ) in a pure exchange 
economy is to devise a fixed-proportions trading mechanism. What these mechanisms do 
is simply to f; : ce the individuals to trade according to some pre-specified proportions. 
One main problem of these mechanisms is efficiency which means that the pre-specified 
trade proportions doesn’t necessaiily imply the individuals to maximize utility through 
trade with respect to these proportions. Now we will start to an analysis of the Barbera, 
Jackson 1992 i)aper called Slrulci^y I ‘roof Exchange.
The economy taken is a classical exchange economy (a pure exchange economy). 
There are n agent and I goods where both n and 1 are finite numbers. An element e€R+"* 
(where R denotes the set of real numbers) is said to be an allocation of the endowments of
n n
the goods anunig n agents. The set .A = |\iR - } shows the set of balanced
/=1 /=1
allocations anci implies the restriction that no good can be thrown away. An element 
x 'eR .‘ shows iie 1-dimensional allocation of goods to agent i. Moreover, Xk'eR+ shows
n
the allocation i.M''the k’th good to agent i. It is assumed that ^  e[ > 0  for each good k.
/ . 1
That means that initially there exists a positive amount of each good in the economy.
The function u' ;R'->R is said to be a utility function o f agent i. The set U denotes 
the set of all uiility functions which are continuous, strictly-quasiconcave, and increasing. 
Here the usage of utility functions instead of preferences doesn’t create an important 
problem. The main limitation is the- assumption of continuity. This is mainly because we 
know that on a compact set, .A, there exists a continuous strict preference relation, P, iff 
there exists a continuous utility function, u, with u = up .
Moreover the above restrictions on U lead it to be a subset of single-peaked preferences 
set since for each u'eU, u' is continuous, increasing and strictly-quasiconcave, u' is a 
single-peaked utility function. (That means it has only one global maximum at the point 
where the agent i takes all the endowments in the economy, and no local maximum at all). 
Moreover the vector u=(u’,....u'’) and (u'',u”)=(u*,. •,u'‘\ u ’',u‘^ ',...,u").
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A tunciion (which is nothing more than a social clioice mle) f:U"->A is said to be 
an allocation rule, Af is the range o f f  and f(ii) denotes the allocation given to agent i at 
the profile u.
Deflnition: (stiategy proofness)
An allocation rule f  is strategy proof if for all isN , for all ueU" and for all u ’‘eU,
u'(f'(u))>u'(f‘(u ‘u’‘)
Definition: (individual rationality)
An allocation rule, f  is said to be indi\ idually rational (w.r.t. the endowment e) if for all
ieN  and for al' iiiU",
u'(f'(u)) >u'(e')
Definition: (anonymity)
An allocation rule, f  is said to be anonymous if for all ueU ” and for all i j s N  s.t. i?ij, 
u’'= u’·' and u' =u' implies f(if*'-’\  u‘, u ’')=f’(u’^ '·^ ', u u^ )
Definition: (diagonality)
A set Bc.A is said to be diagonal if for all isN  and for all x,yeB s.t. x‘ ~>y‘ and
y~>y‘.
Definition:
Given three points a,b,ceA, ab=j.\‘=A / there is a te [0 ,l]  s.t. x= ta+(l-t)b }. Moreover, 
given a preference ordering RiGDi(A), cRiab if there is a te  [0,1] s.t. c'Rita+(l-t)b.
.At the beginning we will take the case of two agents and two goods, and construct 
a mechanism called a fixed-price trading mechanism. Later we will give a theorem saying 
that an allocation rule f  is strategy proof iff it’s implementable by a fixed-price trading 
mechanism.
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The mechanism that will be mentioned though is not a revelation mechanism, it is a 
dominant strategy mechanism. The mechanism simply uses the following procedure;
Given an endowment point eeA
(i) Choose an agent and call him/her <r/gw// /.
(ii) Choose two relative prices (i.e. number of good 2 for one unit of good 1)
Ps! the price at which agent I can offer to sell the first good 
Pi,: the nrice at which agent 2 can offer to sell the first good 
according Ti', the limitation PsiPi,.
The limitation on the prices implies that for any possible allocations x,yeAf, 
exactly one of he following holds: ,\Gey or y€ex or eRjxy for some individual ieN. When 
the preference: are realized agent one declares whether he/she wants to buy or sell the first 
good and up r·) which amount. At the same time agent two declares the amount he/she 
wants to buy ;he first good and the amount he/she wants to sell it. The reason for agent 
two’s declarin :_ two amounts is hisdier being unaware of the direction of the trade (which 
will be determined solely by agent one ) at that moment. This o f course causes an 
asymmetiw betv.'een the agents. .After the amounts are declared, the trade occurs in the 
direction declin ed by the first agent and the volume of trade is determined as the 
minimum of the declarations of the two agents.
If one wants to write the mechanism it is as follows:
Definition: (.A Fixed-price mechanism for the two agents, two goods case)
Given an endcvvvment point e^R and two prices P., and Pb (Ps , Pb6 R+) s.t. P s^b  , a 
fixed-price trading mechanism. m(e,Ps,Pb) is defined as follows; 
m(e,Ps,Pl·)=(X.7I:) where X=.Xi>.X2 and 7r:X—>A is an outcome function.
Xi={neR / -ei' < n < e2'/Pi, 1 and X2=((w,q)6 R.^ / w < e2^ /Ps and q < ei^ } 
7r(n,(w,q))=(x',x") where x' =[ei'-m inin,q), ei"-Pbmin{n,q}] ifn>0
=[ei'-min{-n,w}, e2'+Psmin{-n,w}] if n<0 
and x^  =[ei’-min{n,q}, e2"wPbmin{n,q}] if n>0
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Now tbr any usU", m[ii] is a normal form game with the strategy spaces as given 
above. Given i lie quasi-concavity of the preferences and the condition that Pj < Pb agent 
one will be v\iiling to either to buy or to sell the first good but not both. Moreover agent 
two can choiV'C one or two directions and amounts of trade or can refuse to trade by 
declaring Moreover the limitations on the preferences imply the dominant
strategy of inciividuals to be that elemeni(s) of .Afthat maximizes their utilities (this will be 
a single point for the first individual though there is no such limitation that is imposed by 
the mecbanisir for the second individual). To gain a deeper understanding of the 
mechanism we will analyze an example
Example 1 : ( \ lixed-price trading rule for a two agents and two goods economy)
Let the endov oients of the agents be e' =( 10, 10) and e^  =(5,5). Moreover let the prices be 
given as P,= l and P|,=2. That is. agent one pays two units of the second good per unit of 
the first good il' he/she wants to buy the first good, and gets one unit o f the second good 
per unit of the first good if he/she wanis to sell the first good. Let the preferences of the 
agents be as in the figure below:
=[ei'-min(-n.w}, e2’-Psmin{-n,w}] ifn<0
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If the pieferences are of this type, then the trade will occur in the direction o f agent 
one’s buying the first good and agent two’s selling the first good. Here, because o f the 
kinkedness of the budget line while agent one has a unique maximizing point, agent two 
has two maximizing points, first of which can be reached by buying the first good in 
exchange for the second good and second by selling the first good in exchange for the 
second good. The direction of trade is determined through agent one’s declaration and the 
amount of trade is determined through satisfying the short side of the market which is 
nothing but agent one’s trade proposal.
There may be an alternative case where agent two’s preferences are only through 
one direction of trade. In such a case if the direction of trade declared by the first agent
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m atches w ith  that o f  the second  agent, trade is achieved. O therw ise, no trade occurs.
In the iigure above, agent two’s utility is only maximized through buying the first 
good and thus "eflises any trade in the other direction by simply signaling a zero amount 
for selling the first good. As a result no trade occurs. As also can be seen in the above 
example, the individuals have no incentive to manipulate the mechanism given the 
restrictions imposed on their utilities. They can’t gain from declaring an amount of trade 
more than they really want to, since if the other declares a lesser amount the outcome 
doesn’t change, else if the other agent declares a greater amount than the manipulating 
agent is worse-off since he/she can’t obtain his/her maximizing outcome and obtains 
his/her manipulated outcome. The case is similar for a manipulation through the 
declaration of a lesser amount of trade, the nonmanipulability of the mechanism is because 
of the utilities of the agents being chosen from a set of continuous, strictly-quasiconcave 
and increasing functions. Essentially, in fixed- price trading agents indicate how much they 
are willing to buy or sell according to two fixed prices, and then the short side o f the
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market is rationed. Thus declaring the trade volume and direction that maximizes his/her 
utility is a dominant strategy of an agent independent of whose declaration is accepted for 
trade in tlie mechanism. The following theorem is a special case for the two agents two 
goods case and claims that the only allocation rules which are strategy proof are the ones 
that are implementable by a fixed-price trading mechanism in DSE (the reverse implication 
is also claimed to hold). This is nothing but a characterization of all strategy proof 
allocation rules in a pure exchange economy with two agents and two goods.
Theorem 1:
A social choice function detined on a two person, two goods exchange economy is 
strategy proof : nd individually rational w.r.t. an endowment point iff it’s implementable by 
a fixed-price t'id ing mechanism in DSE.
The proof of this theorem is a simple extension of the general case that will be 
mentioned late:·. One can extend this theorem to a two agents and more than two goods 
case. The only thing that changes is the number of prices given in the beginning and the 
name changing from a fixed-price mechanism to a fixed-proportions mechanism. The 
definition of the fixed-proportions mechanism is quite similar to the prior case. Agent one 
declares a direction and volume of trade and agent two declares his/her demand for each 
direction. The mechanism starts with kgl proportions for trade ( which can be thought of 
as prices) and the agents are limited to those proportions (i.e. they can’t obtain a convex 
combination of them). The only limitation on these proportions is that for any x,ysAf , 
xeey or ysex »or e'Rixy for some ieN. Thus, essentially the trading procedure is a simple 
extension of the fixed-price trading mechanism. If wants to write it formally:
Xi={neR-'' / for each is{ l,...k l, ni>0 implies nj=0 for j e {l,...,l}\{i} and ni<min{ejVpij /
X2={ iTiiR-'^ / for each ie{ l,...k |, mi<:min{ejVpi.j / je {  l,...,l}\{i}}
Here pi.j denotes the j ’th component of the i’th price vector Pi=(Pi,i,...,Pi,i) where 
ie { l   kl since there are k dilTerent proportions (price vectors). Given the strategy
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spaces above, agent one chooses a direction and an amount, and agent two declares the 
amounts of trade for each direction. Then the direction is determined through agent one’s 
strategy and ‘iie amount is determined as the minimum of the two amounts. The 
conditions, as before, implies that the first agent has a unique maximal choice on the 
outcome space. Af. Moreover, the second agent, depending on the number of his/her 
maximizing points on Ar, declares some positive or zero amounts. This is a zero vector in 
R+* where the zero coordinates imply that the second agent doesn’t have any maximizing 
allocation for (his direction of trade. For this case Theorem 1 can be generalized to 
Theorem 2 beh'>w.
Theorem. 2 : two person social choice function is strategy proof and individually
rational w r.t. rn endowment point iff it is the result o f fixed-proportion trading.
One problem associated with these theorems is that the fixed-proportion trading 
rules are asymmetric. That is, changing the roles of the individuals alters the outcome. In 
other words, ti e fixed-proportion trading rules are not anonymous. But, in fact, the set of 
fixed-proportii'P.s trading rules include a subset of anonymous fixed-proportions trading 
rules. This subset is characterized through the specification of the selling and the buying 
prices, this lends to the below corollaiy which is a characterization of the anonymous 
social choice rules which are strategy proof
Corollary 1 : .\ two person social choice function is strategy proof and anonymous iff it is 
the result of fiNed-proportion trading along a line segment centered at the equal split o f the 
total endowment.
What the above corollaiy says is that if the budget curve is not kinked and passes 
through the equal split of the total endowanent point, then there doesn’t arise any need for 
the asymmetry. The main reason for this is the cancellation of the chance that agent two 
can have more than one maximizing allocation. In this case Ps=Pb and both agents declare 
their maximizing allocations as trade proposals. This brings a complete symmetry to the
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system. That is. the choice of the first agent doesn’t alter the outcome. Moreover, the 
strategy spaces can be identical in such a case since in case of a linear budget constraint 
(and gi\en the restrictions on tlie utilities) each agent will have a single maximizing 
allocation poiiu on ,A|·.
Now, iiaving gained a deeirer understanding of the situation, we can generalize the 
above result l·' a case o f n agents and I goods. To simplify the analysis we will impose a 
certain condition on f which is nothing but the non-bossiness property defined by 
Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) [18].
Definition: (Non-bossiness)
A social choice function f  is non-hossy if for any ieN, u g U"  and u”eU
f(u)=f(u‘',u ') implies f(u)=f(u’',u’')
This condition simply claims that if an agent changes his/her preference and his/her 
outcome is nci changed, then the outcome of the other agents should not also change. It 
rules out a series of social choice functions which are not dictatorial but are degenerate in 
other ways. An example ailed out by this condition is an allocation rule where the entire 
endowment is given to the second or to the third agent depending on agent one’s 
preferences [18].
The interesting thing for the general case is that it is possible to incorporate a 
number of projiortions (prices). C'onsidei· the following example for an n agents two goods 
case; There are trade proposals for the integers declining from n-1 to n/2  each of which is 
a set of proportions. For each trade proposal, P(k), the agents declare their demands for 
each proportion. If there is a proportion in P(n-l) s.t, at that proportion exactly n-1 agents 
are willing to buy or exactly n-1 agents are willing to sell , then the trade occurs at that 
proportion. Else, the n-2 trade proposal is checked to see whether there are exactly n-2 
buyers or n-2 sellers at that proposal. This goes on until the last proposal. If  that can’t 
also be matched, no trade occurs. Now. we will give a definition of the fixed-proportions 
trading rule for n agents and I goods in three parts;
1. Trade can occur in one proportion which is selected from an a priori fixed set of 
proportiors which satisfy some additional restrictions. The proportions are grouped
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into subsets called trade proposals. So there are trade proposals P ( n - 1 P ( t )  where t 
is the smallest integer greater than or equal to n/2 .
2. The propoition according to which the trade occurs is selected by examining the 
demands of the agents. Each trade proposal is assigned a number as above and a 
proportion in that proposal is mulched if exactly that number of agents demand trades 
in the same direction.
3. Agents are given trades in the direction of their demanded trade in the selected 
proportion No one’s trade is larger than his/her demanded trade; but one or more 
parts of the market may be rationed. The rationing is done uniformly so that the 
rationed ai: :nts are rationed equally
Definition: (Ti ade proposal)
A trade proposal Pc R' is a set of feasible trade proportions which satisfies the following:
(i) if aeP, thei: a '>0  and a~< 0 and
(ii) ifb eP  and b==a, then there exists aG (0, 1) s.t, aa+ (l-a)b <0
The collection of trade proposals i P(k) / n>k >n/2} should be chosen to satisfy the 
following property for the strategy proof social choice function, f, to be implemented by 
this mechanism.
Definition: (Nestedness of a set of trade proposals)
A collection of trade proposals (F(k) / n;-k >n/2 } are nesled if for each k’<k and aeP (k’) 
and beP/k), either there exists a ■() s.t. ab<a or there exists an a e (0 ,l)  s.t. aa+(l-a)b<0.
For any k s  ¡n-l,...,t} and a eP(k) let o(u’,a,e') be the oeR  which maximizes 
u'(e'+oa) subject to e'+oaeR. '. Now we will define what does a utility profile matching a 
proportion aeP(k):
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Definii ion: (?\ I niching)
Given a nesteci set of'trade proposals | P(k) / n>k >n/2 }, we say that a utility profile ueU" 
matches an asP fk) if there exists a CcN  with #C=k s.t. o(u',a,e') >0 for each ieC  and 
o(u',a,e') <0 foi' each igC.
Ciiven the structure above, the below lemma claims that only one proportion 
matches for a given utility profile of the agents.
Lemma:
IfbeP (k) is m.i-ched and a;^b is in P(k') for some kVk, then a is not matched.
•Since i e proportion along w hich the trade occurs is selected by the signs o f the 
demands rather than their sizes, it will often be necessary to ration. The rationing will be 
done uniformi}' to preserve the doininant strategy implementability o f f  by the given 
mechanism.
Definition: (Uniform rationing)
Consider a usU" which matches aeP(k) and such that for each ieN  there exists and 
r 'e [0,11 s.t. f(u)=e'+r' o(u’,a,e') a. f satisfies uniform rationing at u if
(a) sign[o(u'.a.e')]=sign[o(u',a,e')], and i o(u',a,e’)| >r1 o(u',a,e‘)| and r'<l, imply that 
f(u)=f(u).
(b) s i g n [ o ( u ' ' . a , e ' ) ] = s i g n [ o ( u ' , a , e ' ) ] .  a n d  e i t h e r  I o ( u ’ ' , a , e ' ) |  >r'| o(u',a,e')| and r*<l, or 
I o(u’',a.e')! = : o(u',a,e')l i m p l y  t h a t  f ( u ' ' , u ’ ' ) = f ( u ) .
If trade occurs, then according to the uniform rationing all those who are rationed 
on a gi\ en side are rationed to the same trade. If  some individual is rationed when 
announcing a given utility, then the outcome is the same when that individual announces 
any utility which requests a trade as large or larger along that same proportion. Having
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formed tlie necessary background, we can now give the main characterization theorem of 
Barbera and .lackson.
Theorem:
A social choice function f  is strategy proof anonymous, and non-bossy iff it is the result of 
fixed-proportion trading away from the equal split point.
,\s was mentioned abo\e, this is a full characterization of the strategy proof 
allocation rules that satisfy some additional conditions in an economic environment. The 
fixed-proporti('’ns mechanism defined above implements all these allocation rules and no 
other allocatio- rules. Thus, when a fixed-proportions trading rule is used as the exchange 
rule during the decentralization of the decision power, the individuals have no incentives 
to manipulate the mechanism as it was the case for the Walrasian equilibria in case of 
incomplete inlormation and a finite number of individuals. It is worthwhile to mention that 
though the ouicoine of the mechanism can turn out to be a Walrasian equilibrium of the 
economx accidentally, there is no guarantee for the designer to find and use the optimal 
prices in the mc'chanism since it is being presumed that the information is incomplete. The 
critical point n the achievement of strategy proofness in this mechanism is that the 
designer puts M;e prices, or so to say the proportions, totally independently of the utilities 
o f the agents. would be interesting to analyze a case where the designer would bargain
with an agent to set some specific prices (that makes that individual strictly better-off )in 
turn of some bribe paid to him/her.
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6 ON TI E CARDÎNALH Y OF SINGLE PEAKED DOMAINS
The ta.' I; of limiting the pieference domain so as to overcome the impossibility in 
the obtainmeni of strategy proof social choice rules which are nondictatorial is one o f the 
most fruitful paths followed in the literature. However decomposability, being an abstract 
concept, can r.irely be related to eveiyday applications of social choice theory. One of 
these rare examples is single-peakedness. Single-peaked domains, additional to being 
decomposable, can be applied to many cases in which they seem reasonable. In this 
chapter we wTl tli st define single-peakedness, relate it to the concepts mentioned before 
(as decmnposabiiity) and will tlnally prove a proposition about the limitations that are 
embedded in tiw single-peakedness definition.
.A single-peaked preference relation is simply a one that has a unique global 
maximu.n and i'.o local maxima. That means, given a linear ordering (permutation), a, o f 
the alternative set. A, a single-peaked utility function increases up to some point, reaches 
its maximum a! this point and starts to decrease (w.r.t. the linear order mentioned ). A 
standard examiile of a single peaked preference relation is about drinking beer. You feel 
better with ewoy additional glass up to the n’th glass (where n depends on how much you 
like drinking beer) and then start to feel worse with every additional glass. Here the linear 
order on the alternative set is ( 1 glass, 2 glasses,..., n glasses,,..,K glasses ).
In the definition of a single-peaked i^reference, the ordering of the alternative set 
gains importance. For this purpose we will use a permutation function as follows.
Definition: (Permutation flinction)
Let A=|ai .....a„j be the alternative set. A function a:A —>A is said to be a permutation 
function if it is a 1-1 and onto mapping . The value of a  is shown as
a(A) =(a.r' a„'’). The identity permutation oi takes A to its initial ordering, i.e.
Gi(A)-(ai, ..,a„).
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Given certain ordering of tlie alternative set. A, a permutation function simply 
changes this o;i!ering or leaves it unchanged. I fa  doesn’t change the ordering o f A, then it 
is called an identity permutation and is denoted with Ci. Given an alternative set with 
cardinality n, there exists n! different permutations on A.
ihir the sake of simplicity we will use utility functions instead of preferences. This 
doesn’t impose a limitation to our anal> sis since the alternative set is finite. (Note that this 
implies that any preference relation on .A can be paired with a utility function and any 
utility frnctiop (')ii .A can be paired with a preference relation on A). A utility function on A 
is defined as foNows.
Definit-oii: (l.'hlity function)
Given an alternative set. A, with cardinality n, a 1-1 onto function, u:A—>{!,...,n} is said
to be a uilliy p'ncfion on A.
Gi\ en ' he above definitions, we now can define a single-peaked preference relation 
or so tc say a snigle-peaked utility function.
Definition: (Single-peakedness w.r.t. a permutation)
Given a permutation, a(A)=(a„',...,aa"). on .4, a utility function, u, is said to be single- 
peaked w.r.i. a  if there exists an a„''€A s.t. u(a<j' ),...,u(aCT‘^ ) is increasing and 
u(a<j''),....u(ac") is decreasing. Here a^  ^ denotes that element of A which is the k’th one 
w.r.t the permutation, a. The following example illustrates the concept.
Example 1:
Let A= ai .a2 ,a.; | . Now a utility function, u, s.t. u(ai)=l, u(a2)=3 , u(a3)=2 is single-peaked 
w.r.t. the identity permutation, 0 |. But a utility function u’ s.t. u ’(ai)=3, u’(a2)= l, u’(a3)=2 
is not s 'lgle-peaked w.r.t. Oi. Moreover, given a permutation a  s.t. o(A)=(a2 ,ai ,^3), u ’ is 
single-peaked w.r.t. a  since u’(a„')=u’(a2)=l, u’(aa^)=u’(ai)=3, u’(ao0 ^ ’(a3)“ 2 .
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S ngle-peaked preferences were first introduced by D. J. Black in 1948 [2]. Then 
M. Duinmet ;ind R. Farquharson [6] showed that in case of a majority rule with Borda 
completion as the mechanism, if the true preference profiles of the group’s members are 
single-peaked and the ballots which the members are permitted to cast are restricted so as 
to allow expression only of single-peaked orderings, then every member’s dominant 
strategy s to cast that ballot which faithfully represents his/her true preferences. In other 
words, they stated that a majority mle with Borda completion is strategy proof whenever 
both sincere p: c!erences and ballots are a priori restricted to be single-peaked. Later J. M. 
Blin and M. A. Satterthwaite [4] showed that single-peakedness of preferences alone 
without a restriction on admissible ballots is insufficient to guarantee strategy proofhess.
The single-peaked domains are shown to be decomposable by Kalai and Muller in 
their 1977 pacer [1 1]. This is simply as follows:
Proposition: (Kalai and Muller)
A domain of siagie-peaked preferences is decomposable
proof: Take any permutation, g, of the alternative set. A, and define the set o f single- 
peaked prefeiei'ces w.r.t a  by Sc^=iPg Li.A): for every x,y,zsA s.t. x^y^z  ifxoyaz (which 
means that x r. ececles y and y precedes z in the permutation a) then it is not the case that 
xPy and zPy :.
Let Ri =!(x,y)aT / .xoy }. Clearly 0=TRcrR|Çz:T. So, all that is left to show is that Ri is 
closed under decisiveness implications.
D lla , We suppose that (x,y)çR| and for some P', P^eSo xP*yP’z and yP^zP^x. These 
relations imply that in a, x can not be between y and z, and z can not be between x and y. 
Thus y must be the middle one and since xay we must have xoyaz. Thus (x ,z )eR i.
D llb. (z.x)€R: . xP'yP'z and yP'zP^x Again y must be the middle one so we must have 
zoyax. Thus, (y,x)eRi .
DI2a. (x.yjsRi , (y,z)sRi and for some PeS<j , xPyPz . This shows that xcryaz. Thus 
(x,z)6R| .
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DI2b. (/..\)sR i and for some P€S„ , \PyPz. This shows that xay or equivalently (z,y)eRi.
QED.
The above result states that a single-peaked domain, being decomposable, admits 
the construction of a strategy proof Pareto optimal and nondictatorial social choice 
function, whicli is known to be implemented by the majority mle with Borda completion.
Definiti('u: (.A majority rule with Borda completion)
Given a ballot oroiile, PsL(A )". a majority rule with Borda completion, n(P), is defined 
as follov s: 7rtn = a  if there is a Condoi cet winner aeA.(i.e. for all (a,b)çA where b^ i^ a, a 
beats b i 1 maj- i ity voting ). If there is not a Condorcet winner, each xeA  is assigned a 
total poi It as t'le sum of each individuals given points, which is for each individual ieN , 
#(A)-k,- .^ where ki is the rank of x in P| The element with the highest points wins. If 
there occurs a tie. then the ballot of the first individual is used to break the tie.
I ’p to :'ow. we saw that single-peaked domains are sufficient for majority rules 
with B ’>rda completion to satisfy strategy proofhess, Pareto optimality and 
nondictatorialiiy. But how much limitation does the single-peakedness assumption impose 
to the system'i’ One essential point regarding this question is that the individuals have to 
have single-peaked preferences w.r.t. the same permutation. If  two different individuals 
have single-peaked preferences w.r.t different permutations then that profile can’t be 
called a single-peaked profile. Given the structure above we can easily claim that for a 
certain permutation, a. there exists exactly 2"'' distinct preferences (utility functions) 
which are single peaked w.r.t a.
Proposition:
Given a permutation g on A, there are exactly 2"'' distinct utility functions which are 
single-peaked 'v.r.t. a.
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proof: a permutation, a, gives a linear orders o f the alternatives as (ao\...,ao"). We
will sin'ply cornt the admissible utility profiles.
Take ary an’'i£iaa',...,aa''). Assume that u is maximized at Then u(a<j’^ )=n. Now for the 
first k-i oarts on the left of a '^ there are C(n-l,k-l) different ways to assign utility values 
withoui damaging single-peakedness. Determination of the left side automatically 
determines the right side. So, for each k € | l,...,n} there are C(n-l,k-l) different utility 
functions to place which are single-peaked w.r.t the given a.
Since his holds for all kG|l,...n|. there are C(n-l,0)+C(n-l,l)+...-i-C(n-l,n-l)=2"'* 
distinct i dlity functions which are single-peaked w.r.t a.
QED.
I sing die same method, one can also prove that there exists 2"'* distinct 
permut iiions ■' r.i which a given utility function is single-peaked. Given this limitation 
imposed by a permutation, o. on the number of distinct utility functions we can ask the 
questio 1 of v\ ! ti is the probability of the existence of a society in which all the individuals 
have si igie-pe;:ked |)references w.r.t the same permutation. For this analysis let us create 
the folio-ving scenario. There is a grouj) of k individuals who have to make a social choice 
among n alterr atives. Each individual randomly selects a utility function for himselEherself 
from a b 'wl c '  utility functions. There are n! distinct utility functions. Note that any utility 
function is single-peaked w.r.t 2"·' distinct permutations. Now there are (n!)'' different 
profiles that c;in be obtained via this process. Moreover one can count the admissible 
profiles (i.e. single-peaked w.r.t. the same a), #Ad, as follows:
#Ad=#Adl+ . . +Md(n!)-Z#(,S·,. n ,s ;  )-f Z # ( .s ;  n S ,^ y . . .+ # ( S \ r x . r ^ , J
Now , #,'\.dk denotes the number of admissible profiles w.r.t ak for each ke{l,...,(n!)}. 
But since a utility profile can be single-peaked w.r.t. more than one permutation there 
occurs a double counting problem. Thus the number o f twofold intersections are 
subtracted, the threefold intersections are added and so on. Here for any ie{l,...,(n!)}, Sg.^
denote.'· the set of utility profiles which are single-peaked w.r.t. a·, . Moreover
73
#Ad’=i Ad\+ ... +#Ad(n!)>#Ad since there is a double counting problem. What we claim 
is the frl! owing proposition.
Propos'tion:
The prol'jability of obtaining a profile in which each preference relation is single-peaked 
w.r.t. t u. san'.e permutation goes to zero as the cardinality of the alternative set. A, goes 
to infin t; .
# A d  #A d'
proof: NOW, S'is probability can be defined as P(n)=-— 7- < -—- r
(//!) (n!)
Moreo' e ·, as ■ goes to infinity P(n) is bounded from both directions. That is
^.4d r-Ad'
0 < lim ----- r  -  !im----- -
Now w e will i.i.‘ e the Sandwich theorem to prove the proposition:
'!ii
.. # A . i '  n \ { 2 " - ' Y  ( r - ' Y  (2 ■ *-'2 '” ' ) ' - '
lim-----7· = lim-------7—  = lim------t t  = lim-
« ■· (//!)'■ -.·' (//!)' (77!) A - -1
/7 - 1 ) 1 /;-!
<l im( ' -— — ‘ = lim(— - )  =0/;! ·.· >' //!
UAd . #A d
0 ^  lim----- T- ;... 0 —> lim----- r  = 0
«>'(//')* -> '(//!) '
Thus t^  e probaiiility of obtaining a single-peaked profile (w.r.t. the same permutation) 
goes tc zero rr the cardinality ol'.A goes to infinity.
QED.
This proposition means that if the individuals have preferences on the amount of 
beer they drink instead of the number of glasses, then it is impossible for them to have 
single-peaked preferences w.r.t. the same permutation of the alternative set.
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7 ( ONC V/l;S10NS
1 1 tliis study we aimed at presenting a survey o f the literature on strategy 
proofnc' CO : ining it with the relev ant concepts. While doing this we tried to combine a 
wide variety ( .'ditferent terminologv in a single framework so as to create a unity in the 
present I ion W i· ease of understanding the relationships among these concepts. Some 
relations were di eady constructed while we had started to study, we presented them with 
the relev int re .'lences. Moreovei'. uc tried to close the gap in terms of the construction of 
the relatюnslı· s among these concepts, and thus to present a full picture of the 
implementatic business.
Г tere e six main concepts that we analyzed and tried to embed into a unity in 
this studv. Th ' e ai e strategy proofness, iinplementability, impossibility in implementation, 
use of tiiese C( ace|)ts in economics litei ature, ways to get rid of this impossibility problem 
and the limita · that are brought about while utilizing these ways.
During his w ork, it is seen that there is not a one-to-one relation between strategy 
proofness and dominant strategy implementibility. However, when the preference domain 
is restricted tc be a subset of linear orders this can be achieved. Moreover this one-to- 
oneness van be generalized for the generalized social choice functions and it is seen that in 
this case strategy proofness turns and till kinds of dominant strategy implementibility turns 
out to be equiv alent.
-.nothc;· fnding is that in case of limiting the preference domain to be a subset of 
the linea ■ ordc- s, ail dominant strategy implementable social choice rules turn out to be 
singletOi'-valued. Because of this and the above findings, the limitation of the preference 
domain lo be a subset of the linear orders becomes and important limitation. Most of the 
implicati MIS arc shown not to hold when this limitation is not utilized.
1 here aie also some additions to the literature such as pseudo implementation, 
total imulemcntation and a full characterization of the relationship among these and 
strategy -иоотсх;;. Tlieie is also a new impossibility theorem which is an extension of the
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■iwaite impos.sibility theorem for generalized social choice rules. The 
n of the domains that ¡'¡ermit the existence of dominant strategy 
■Kicial choice rules that are nondictatorial, is still open. However, it is seen 
ir.'osibility chaiacierization is not sufficient to deal with generalized social
known example of decomposable domains is the single-peakedness 
. ,^s a result of an analvsis of the single-peakedness condition it is found 
¡)eal:ecl domains aie \ ery rare and the probability of obtaining a single- 
.:oes to zero as the number of alternatives goes to infinity, 
sol' of ihe negabxe results that are obtained about the existence of a 
and dominant stratège implementable social choice rule, Nash 
. is anale zed brietle The main theorems about this concept are presented to 
■\Nat has been dime in this area.
re 'ГЛО paths that ■;an be followed to improve this study on implementation, 
ı har thei e is an open question about the generalization of the impossibility
iniplementibiiite for social choice functions. The result is for two 
' ever, w e have a feeling that this can be generalized for the case o f more 
fuals. Tne second patlı is the improvement of the literature on dominant 
entation by tiy ing to construct a full characterization of the dominant 
:cr.table .social clioice rules that are nondictatorial.
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